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Introduction
THE INCREASING PROLIFERATION of mass media and the com-
modification of identity that has accompanied this proliferation is a
well-known characteristic of our modern age.' Advances in mass print-
ing technologies in the nineteenth century resulted in mass advertis-
ing, "'convert[ing] gossip into a marketable commodity.' '"2 The
twentieth century witnessed the development of mass reproduction of
sound and distribution of moving pictures, fueling the rise in value of
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Fellow of the McCarthy Institute for Intellectual Property. Finally, I would like to thank my
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1. See Oliver R. Goodenaugh, Retheorising Privacy and Publicity, I I.P.Q. 37, 39-40
(1997); see also George M. Armstrong, Jr., The Reification of Celebrity: Persons as Property, 51
LA. L. REv. 443, 444 (1991).
2. Goodenaugh, supra note 1, at 40 (citing E.L. Godkin, writing in Scribner's Maga-
zine,July 1890, quoted in DON R. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS, THE LAW, THE MASS MEDIA,
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 16 (1972)).
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celebrity identity.3 Today, widespread access to broadband technolo-
gies and the explosive growth of the Internet has inaugurated the age
of do-it-yourself marketing where anyone can be a star.4 Advertisers,
confronted with the success of video-sharing sites such as YouTube,
and the increasing popularity of social networking sites such as
Facebook and MySpace, are in the process of radically transforming
the techniques they use to reach consumers. 5 While the associative
value of human identity as a means of attracting attention to con-
sumer products is as pervasive as ever, in the future it is likely that
everyone and anyone, as much as celebrities, will command advertis-
ers' interest on a scale previously unattainable.
6
Concurrently, the geographically limitless reach of media tech-
nology, typified by the growth of the Internet and satellite television,
has provoked increasing international attention to the legal protec-
tion afforded the individual's interest in his or her identity. 7 Within
this context, many scholars and commentators regard the United
States as "at the forefront of nations regarding the development and
implementation of ... the right of publicity,' 8 a relatively recent intel-
3. Id. Goodenaugh cites in this regard the Ninth Circuit's observation in White v.
Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992), r'hg denied, 989 F.2d
1512 (9th Cir. 1993): "Television and other media create marketable celebrity value. Con-
siderable energy and ingenuity are expended by those who have achieved celebrity identity
value to exploit it for profit."
4. See, e.g., Manohla Dargis, Hot Properties: How the Old Hollywood Studio System Discov-
ered, Refurbished, Sold and Sold Out Its Most Glamorous Commodities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2007,
§ 7, at 17 ("In this area of D.I.Y. stardom, you don't need God or Goldwyn to grab your 15
minutes; you need only a webcam and the minor technological wherewithal to upload your
own fabulousness. Information dissemination is cheap thanks to the Internet, and now so
is fame, which has become the virtual-reality birthright of every Tom, Dick, and
Lonelygirl115 itching to go viral. In the new global meritocracy, anyone can be a star.").
5. Facebook's recent (although ultimately unsuccessful) attempt to introduce
through its social network "social advertising," where users' profile photos next to commer-
cial messages are shown to their friends about items they purchased or registered an opin-
ion about, is an example of the type of techniques advertisers may now hope to develop. See
Louise Storey, Facebook is Marketing Your Brand Preferences (With Your Permission), N.Y. TiMES,
Nov. 7, 2007, at C3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/200 7 / 1 1/07/technology/
07adco.html.
6. See Goodenaugh, supra note 1, at 39-40 (describing how effective advertising has
used "[p] eople, their faces, history, and identities" to capture the interest of other people,
using celebrities as well as the previously unknown, since the mass reproduction and distri-
bution of print and picture at the close of the nineteenth century).
7. See F. Jay Dougherty, Symposium Foreword: The Right of Publicity-Towards a Compara-
tive and International Perspective, 18 Lov. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 421, 422 n.5 (1998); Alain J.
Lapter, How the Other Half Lives (Revisited): Twenty Years Since Midler v. Ford-A Global Per-
spective on the Right of Publicity, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 239, 243-44 (2007).
8. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality and Reputational Interests of Con-
structed Personas Through Moral Rights: A Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century, 2001 U. ILL. L.
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lectual property doctrine that protects individuals against the com-
mercial exploitation of their identities. 9 Although international
commentators often look to the United States as a model for the
right's development, 10 the right itself in the United States has pro-
voked much scholarly and judicial dispute, 1 with some legal commen-
tators going so far as to call for the right's demise. 12
Much of the dispute in the United States has concerned the "elu-
siveness of a theoretical justification for the right of publicity. 1 3 One
strand of this critique focuses on the predominant justification for the
right by the classical natural rights labor theory of intellectual prop-
erty' 4 and finds its resulting emphasis on the proprietary economic
REv. 151, 152; see also Emily Grant, Comment, The Right of Publicity: Recovering Stolen Identi-
ties Under International Law, 7 SAN DIEGo INT'L L.J. 559, 562 (2006) (asserting the develop-
ment of the United States right of publicity suggests the most complete, although not
perfect, set of laws to protect persona).
9. The right of publicity in the United States originated in the right of privacy, and
separated as an independent right during the 1950s. The doctrine was first articulated in
the Second Circuit decision, Haelan Labortories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d
866 (2d Cir. 1953). See I J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PPuVACv
§ 1:26 (2d ed. 2007). In the United States, courts have expressly recognized the right of
publicity as existing under the common law of eighteen states. Id. § 6:3. Of those, eight also
have statutory provisions broad enough to encompass the right of publicity. Id. In addition,
ten states have statutes which, while some are labeled "privacy" statutes, are worded in such
a way that most aspects of the right of publicity are embodied in those statutes. Id. Thus,
under either statute or common law, the right of publicity is recognized as the law of
twenty-eight states. Id.
10. See, e.g., Jan Klink, 50 Years of Publicity Rights in the United States and the Never Ending
Hassle with Intellectual Property and Personality Rights in Europe, 4 I.P.Q. 363, 363-87 (2003);
Rosina Zapparoni, Propertising Identity: Understanding the United States Right of Publicity and its
Implications-Some Lessons for Australia, 28 MELB. U. L. REv. 690, 692 (2004).
11. See McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 1:40; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the
Right of Publicity Can Learn From Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1162-63 (2006).
12. See Lee Goldman, Elvis Is Alive, But He Shouldn't Be: The Right of Publicity Revisited,
1992 BYU L. REv. 597, 598; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40
Hous. L. REV. 903, 929 (2004).
13. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1162.
14. McCarthy explains this concept this way:
The natural rights of property justification is an appeal to first principles ofjus-
tice. Each and every human being should be given control over the commercial
use of his or her identity. Perhaps nothing is so strongly intuited as the notion
that my identity is mine--it is my property to control as I see fit.
McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 2:1. John Locke's labor theory represents the classic formula-
tion of the natural rights theory of intellectual property. See WendyJ. Gordon, A Property
Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102
YALE L.J. 1533, 1540 (1993) (asserting that courts have so often applied Lockean labor
theory as a justification for intellectual property rights that courts have misapplied certain
key aspects of the theory); see also Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of
Author Autonomy in the Unzted States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENr.
L.J. 1, 9-11 (asserting that Lockean natural rights labor theory provided a predominant
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elements of right of publicity claims troubling. 15 Unlike the restric-
tions on the exclusive rights embodied in other intellectual property,
such as copyrights and patents, no inherent limits structure the scope
of intellectual property rights in identity. 16 According to this view, the
formalist classification of publicity rights as property, bolstered by the
moral claims of Lockean labor theory, has led to the construction of
"a property right of remarkable and dangerous breadth. ' 17 By broadly
conceptualizing identity as property, courts in the United States have
increasingly expanded the identity protections afforded by the right,
at the expense of the public's interest in expression and the free dis-
semination of information, often without a thorough analysis of the
actual interests involved.1 8
In addition, the natural rights labor theory justification tradition-
ally offered in support of intellectual property rights rests upon a fun-
damental incoherence when applied to property rights in persona.' 9
While Lockean labor theory may provide some support for justifying
celebrity publicity rights,20 assuming that celebrities do purposefully
exert effort to create a public persona, the theory does little to explain
why noncelebrities should equally benefit from that protection.21 The
doctrine's incoherence is also evident in the way that courts may still
justification for copyright law in the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries and continues to justify copyright today by modern day proponents of this theory).
15. See, e.g., Alice Haemmerli, Whose ho? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49
DuKE L.J. 383 (1999); Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition,
67 U. Prr. L. REv. 225 (2006).
16. Unlike other intellectual property areas such as copyright and patent law, public-
ity rights are almost unlimited in scope, particularly where the use is labeled "commercial."
David S. Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailing Jell-O to a Wall: The Vanna White Case and the
Limits of Celebrity Rights, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 67, 88 (1995). Congress provided limited
monopolies over ideal objects to provide incentives for innovation because without some
monopoly control by the creator, creativity would be stifled. Id. Patents and copyrights,
however, are limited both in time and in scope. Id. By contrast, limitations providing for
the public interest such as the fair use doctrine in copyright law or the disclosure incen-
tives for patents do not exist under the right of publicity. Id. at 88-89.
17. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting).
18. Id.; see McKenna, supra note 15, at 246 (asserting that the property label has be-
come so powerful that courts and some commentators have "short-circuited analysis of the
appropriateness and/or scope of protection and offered no more of a justification for the
claim than that identity is property").
19. See infra Part I.C.
20. This claim has been strongly criticized. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of
Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 188-95 (1993) (assert-
ing that celebrities do not earn their right to publicity, because fame and celebrity are
conferred by others in the construction of social meaning).
21. See infra Part I.C.1.
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consider the personal interests of the individual despite their pur-
ported sole focus on the right as an economic property right.2 2 The
expansion of the right of publicity doctrine coupled with this internal
incoherence has led some legal theorists to advocate a rearticulation
of the right based on a theory that would both limit its breadth and
provide a sounder conceptual basis than the natural rights intellectual
property justifications generally advanced. These critics argue for a
right based on autonomy rather than labor theory, asserting that the
proper focus of the right is not the work product, but the individual. 23
A publicity right based on individual autonomy retains the moral
force of the natural rights justification, while also furnishing a more
logically coherent theoretical support for the right.2 4 An autonomy-
based theory of identity protection incorporates the important insight
that some forms of property are more essential to personhood than
others,25 and that property in persona-"the inherent right of every
human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity"26-
deserves a particular form of protection in our legal system. 27 The
currently prevailing formalist conception envisions the right of public-
ity as a traditional intellectual property right.28 A focus on individual
autonomy, however, permits inclusion of both the personal and
purely economic elements of the right, and enables a particular "form
of intellectual property," incorporating a "sui generis mixture of per-
sonal rights, property rights, and rights under the law of unfair com-
22. See infra Part I.C.2.
23. See Haemmerli, supra note 15, at 402-03, 412-28 (advocating a publicity right
based on Kantian autonomy rationale); McKenna, supra note 15, at 279-93 (advocating a
publicity right based on the individual's interest in autonomous self-definition).
24. See infra Part I.C.3. According to Justin Hughes, the most powerful alternative to
the Lockean model of property is the personality justification which, "like the labor theory,
• . .has an intuitive appeal when applied to intellectual property: an idea belongs to its
creator because the idea is the manifestation of the creator's personality or self." Justin
Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. LJ. 287, 330 (1988).
25. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 971-78,
1013-15 (1982) (arguing on the basis of Hegelian theory that some property, like a per-
son's home, is more personal than others, and therefore is entitled to special types of
treatment and different kinds of protection).
26. McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 1:3.
27. See id. § 1:40 (stating that a sui generis legal "'right of identity' with damages mea-
sured by both mental distress and commercial loss" would constitute a more coherent legal
doctrine but that the law of publicity rights in the United States has not developed in such
a coherent fashion).
28. See David Westfall & David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. LJ. 71, 76-83, 122-23 (2005) (tracing the right of publicity's origin from a
carefully considered narrow functionalist approach to the problem of assignability to its
current formalist incorporation as intellectual property under "the property syllogism").
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petition,"2 9 a perspective one of the right's leading commentators
suggests may constitute a "more accurate" approach.
30
Despite the intuitive force of the autonomy-based rationale, legal
scholars often dismiss an autonomy-based publicity right as "quaint,"3 1
or as inappropriate based on its lack of historical or global precedent
as a publicity right justification. 32 In light of this, and the increasing
international interest in the right itself, other jurisdictions which simi-
larly protect against the commercial exploitation of identity provide
an instructive perspective. Indeed, a rearticulation of the publicity
right based on an autonomy rationale strongly resembles the concep-
tualization of personality rights in Germany, which is based on individ-
ual autonomy. 33 German personality rights provide protection for
both economic and personal interests, 34 and rest upon a primarily
Kantian notion of individual freedom and personal dignity.35 Unlike
publicity rights in the United States, however, German personality
rights do not constitute intellectual property and are therefore not
fully alienable.3 6 Because of this limitation, legal scholars comparing
the two generally consider German personality rights to be concep-
tually fundamentally different from publicity rights in the United
States. 37 A careful examination, however, reveals that a comparison of
the American and German approaches offers critical insight as as to
how an autonomy-based sui generis publicity right might be
structured.
This Comment examines United States publicity rights in light of
the autonomy critique and its civil law parallel in German personality
rights to argue that a publicity right based on autonomy theory is not
only possible, but plausible. An investigation of the key theories un-
derlying the rights and their corresponding scope suggests the
strength of autonomy theory in providing a coherent basis for a sui
generis publicity right that incorporates both personal and proprie-
29. McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 1:7 (quoting S.J. Hoffman, Limitations on the Right of
Publicity, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOG'Y 111, 112 (1980) (internal quotations omitted)).
30. Id.
31. Goldman, supra note 12, at 606.
32. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1163 (asserting the impropriety of a moral
right of control justification for publicity rights in the absence of such a right in most of
the world and throughout most of United States history).
33. See infra Part II.
34. See infra Part II.B.1.
35. See infra Part II.B.2.
36. See infra Part II.B.2.
37. See, e.g., Susanne Bergmann, Publicity Rights in the United States and Germany: A Com-
parative Analysis, 19 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 479, 521-22 (1999).
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tary interests, and protects both celebrities and non-celebrities alike.
In contrast to the current traditional intellectual property rationales
supporting the right, a publicity right based on individual autonomy
rationally limits the right's current expansionist tendencies, by re-
stricting the indicia of identity to more personal individual attributes.
This restriction in turn impedes the right's potential to invade the
public's interest in protected speech. Autonomy theory further aligns
with the origins of the United States publicity doctrine in privacy and
provides a careful balancing of conflicting interests in a way that a
publicity right built on traditional intellectual property rationales does
not. Most importantly, a publicity right based on autonomy preserves
the moral strength of the claim, by incorporating basic principles of
individual freedom and personal dignity-foundational notions em-
bedded in the American legal tradition. 38 Even outspoken critics of
the right of publicity concede the intuitive force of the moral claim
underlying the right of publicity. 39 Given the likely continued trans-
formation of advertising techniques due to the growth of new media
technologies, a rearticulation of the basic rationale underlying the
right that provides a more coherent and comprehensive protection
for all individuals is necessary now more than ever.
Many analyses of publicity and personality rights have looked to
the United States as the leader in developing publicity rights, but few
38. See Haemmerli, supra note 15, at 413-14. Indeed, the Lockean labor theory itself
proceeds from the premise that the individual as an autonomous being precedes the crea-
tion of property. See Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copynghts Morally Justified? The Philoso-
phy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, zn Copy FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 43, 55-57 (Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews eds., 2002).
Palmer asserts that the hinge to a Lockean labor theory of property is ownership in our-
selves. Id. at 57. "Our ownership rights in ourselves are based on our natural freedom, and
are indeed synonymous with it; they cannot rest on labor-based moral desert, as we are not
the products of our own labor." Id. This is precisely the rationale underlying Kantian per-
sonality rights as personal rights and therefore not constitutive of intellectual property. See
infta Parts II.B.1, II.B.2. Kim Treiger-Bar-Am notes the incoherency of mixing personality,
property, and Kant in the context of copyright law, but argues that Kantian autonomy
theory can serve as support for the Anglo-American model of authors' rights, observing
that "[t ] he idea of autonomy of expression is central to our legal system and society, and its
roots can be traced to Kant." Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, Kant on Copyright: Rights of Transformative
Authorship, 25 CARDozo ARTS & Ewr. L.J. 1059, 1064-65, 1075 (2008). Treiger-Bar-Am ar-
gues that a Kantian concept of autonomy supports an Anglo-American theory of authorial
expression in affording "authors autonomy, namely choice and control over their expres-
sion." Id. at 1075. Treiger-Bar-Am describes this Kantian notion of autonomy as choice "as
the basis for many of the fundamental rights in the United States and England." Id. at
1093.
39. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 12, at 929 (acknowledging that "[tihe right of public-
ity may seem intuitively appealing to many people").
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have analyzed how publicity rights40 in the United States might bene-
fit from a comparative approach. The expansion of international
transactions, the globalization of legal culture, and the movements for
unification, federation, and law reform around the world suggest the
desirability of a comparative approach now more than ever.41 In the
United States itself, the history of publicity rights is "one in which le-
gal commentators have had an extraordinary impact on the develop-
ment of the law . . plant[ing] the philosophical seeds which
practitioners and the courts have cultivated. Thus has theory been
turned into practice to create a growing and thriving field of law."42
By analyzing the key theoretical justifications that structure United
States publicity rights and German personality rights, this Comment
contributes to the ongoing debate regarding how the law ought to
conceptualize persona for the purposes of legal protection within a
comparative context.
Part I of this Comment briefly surveys the right of publicity in the
United States and its predominant natural rights labor theory ratio-
nale. In so doing, it provides a critique of labor theory from the per-
spective of an autonomy-based publicity right. This analysis then
briefly touches upon the history of the right of publicity in the United
States and its historical origins in privacy, which strongly resemble cer-
tain theoretical characteristics of German personality rights. Part II of
this Comment then looks to the philosophical conceptualization of
personality rights in Germany to suggest the plausibility of an Ameri-
can sui generis publicity right, encompassing both personal and pro-
prietary interests, justified by a theory of individual autonomy. Finally,
Part III of this Comment concludes by suggesting how a publicity right
based on an autonomy rationale might be structured.
I. The United States Right of Publicity
A. Survey of the Right of Publicity
In the United States, the right of publicity is a state-law created
intellectual property right comprising "the inherent right of every
human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity."43
Infringement of the right is a commercial tort of unfair competition, 44
40. See, e.g., Klink, supra note 10, at 364; Zapparoni, supra note 10, at 692.
41. Dougherty, supra note 7, at 421 (citing P. John Kozyris, Comparative Law for the
Twenty-First Century: New Horizons and New Technologies, 69 TUL. L. REV. 165, 178 (1994)).
42. McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 1:4.
43. Id. § 1:3.
44. Id.
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evidenced by the right's inclusion in the Restatement of Unfair Com-
petition.45 The Restatement recognizes the right of publicity as an ap-
propriation of trade values, stating that "[o]ne who causes harm to
the commercial relations of another by appropriating the other's in-
tangible trade values is subject to liability to the other for such harm
only if ... the actor is subject to liability for an appropriation of the
commercial value of the other's identity. '46 Section 46 of the Restate-
ment further defines the cause of action for a right of publicity, pro-
viding that "[o]ne who appropriates the commercial value of a
person's identity by using without consent the person's name, like-
ness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to
liability."47
Although technically the right of publicity protects everyone,
courts have primarily focused on celebrities because celebrities have
greater incentive to litigate claims for commercial exploitation of
their identities than non-celebrities. 48 A quintessential right of public-
ity case targets a defendant's use of a celebrity's name or likeness in
advertising to draw attention to an ad.49 The attributes of identity that
are protected, however, have undergone a dramatic expansion from
the right's original focus on name or picture to include indicia of
identity that merely evoke celebrity identity.50 The right of publicity
has been used to prevent advertisers from imitating Bette Midler's
characteristic voice and singing style, 51 to protect a race car driver's
right to publicize his identity,52 and controversially, to prohibit a com-
pany from featuring a blonde robot mechanically turning letters of a
game show set, just like hostess Vanna White's role on "Wheel of For-
tune."53 Following the Ninth Circuit's now well-known decision in the
latter case, 54 critics charged that the court had overstepped the neces-
sary limits of the doctrine by continually expanding its parameters to
45. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-49 (1995).
46. Id. § 38.
47. Id. § 46.
48. McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 4:20.
49. See J. Thomas McCarthy, The Human Persona as Commercial Property: The Right of
Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 129, 133 (1995).
50. Westfall & Landau, supra note 28, at 91-93.
51. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
52. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
53. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), r'hg denied, 989
F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).
54. Id.
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include attributes of identity that only indirectly evoked the persona
of the individual in the minds of consumers. 55
1. The Expansion of the Property Right in Persona: Indicia of
Identity
The Ninth Circuit has greatly influenced the development of
publicity rights in the United States in a series of oft-cited decisions
that expanded the outer limits of identifiability to include attributes
beyond mere name and picture. 56 For example, in Motschenbacher v.
RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,57 the plaintiff, a famous race car driver,
brought a claim for misappropriation of his name, likeness, personal-
ity, and endorsement for a national cigarette ad that featured a car
identifiable as one he usually drove.58 Although the driver in the ad-
vertisement's photograph was neither recognizable nor expressly
identified by name, and the car featured in the advertisement was not
the driver's car, the plaintiff had consistently "individualized" his cars
enough to set them apart from those of other drivers, making them
more readily identifiable as his own.5 9 Because the advertisement
"caused some persons to think the car in question was [the] plain-
tiffs"60 and thus to "infer that the person driving the car was the plain-
tiff,"6 1 the Ninth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs "proprietary
interest in his own identity" may have been appropriated. 62
The decision in Motschenbacher provided the basis for the court's
subsequent decisions concerning protection of a plaintiffs voice as
indicative of identity.63 In a pair of decisions, the Ninth Circuit upheld
the plaintiffs' right to sue companies that had imitated a singer's dis-
tinctive voice and singing style.64 In Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,65 the
55. See, e.g., Welkowitz, supra note 16, at 68 (stating that the "metaphoric" use of iden-
tity as part of the publicity right's expansion transcends the limits of traditional intellectual
property).
56. Westfall & Landau, supra note 28, at 91; see also Lapter, supra note 7, at 242. Lapter
notes, however, that not all states have followed the Ninth Circuit's lead in expanding the
identity parameters of the right. Id. Many state statutes restrict the protections the right
affords to name and likeness. Id.
57. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
58. Id. at 822.
59. Id. at 822-23.
60. Id. at 827.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 825-26.
63. Welkowitz, supra note 16, at 72.
64. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1988).
65. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
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court cited Motschenbacher extensively to support its finding that Ford
had unlawfully appropriated "part of [Midler's] identity" when an ad-
vertising agency imitated Midler's voice in a song known to be sung by
her.66 In the subsequent case of Waits v. Frito-Lay Inc, 67 the court fur-
ther found that although the ad agency's song featured in the adver-
tisement "echoed the rhyming word play of [a] Waits song," the
singer's "gravelly" distinctive singing style was clearly identifiable as
Waits and the court found his identity through misapropriation of his
voice illegally infringed.68
In White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,69 the Ninth Circuit
relied on these decisions in holding that an advertisement featuring a
robot in a blonde wig and gown, standing next to a set of capital let-
ters like those on the Wheel of Fortune game show, evoked Vanna
White's identity in the mind of an individual viewing the advertise-
ment-and did so enough that it might violate her common law right
of publicity. 70 As in the preceding decisions, the advertisement at is-
sue did not involve White's actual picture or likeness (or accessory
(car), or voice). Yet the court nevertheless found that the evocation of
White's identity in the context of a game show may constitute suffi-
cient infringement on her right of publicity. 7'
Such decisions have not been limited to the Ninth Circuit. The
Sixth Circuit has held that a typical phrase associated with a celebrity
plaintiff violated the celebrity's right of publicity, 72 while the Third
Circuit has upheld an actor's right to sue for infringement based on
the fictional television character that the court found potentially "in-
extricably identified" with him. 73 As courts have increasingly con-
66. Id. at 463-64.
67. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
68. Id. at 1097-98, 1112. In considering the defendant's claim that the jury instruc-
tions were in error, the court emphasized the distinction between Waits's singing "style"
and voice, noting that style was not protected whereas voice, when identifiable as Waits,
constituted one of the elements of protected indicia of identity. Id. at 1101-02.
69. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), r'hg denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).
70. Id. at 1399.
71. Id.
72. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836-37 (6th Cir.
1983) (holding that the phrase "Here's Johnny" in an advertisement for portable toilets
violated the plaintiffs right of publicity).
73. See McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 921-22 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that restau-
rant's use of name and image of screen actor's fictional character "Spanky McFarland" was
sufficient to constitute a violation of the actor's right of publicity when actor's own identity
would be invoked by use of fictional character). The Ninth Circuit has also upheld actors'
right of publicity in their fictional characters. See Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806,
810-12 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding possible violation of right of publicity when airport restau-
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strued identity in this expansive fashion, they have also found
violations of publicity rights where the defendant's use is not tradi-
tionally commercial. Well-noted examples include the use of the
Three Stooges' charcoal portraits reproduced on t-shirts,74 the use of
Rosa Parks's name as the title of a song,75 and the use of the name of
the former hockey player, Tony Twist, as a mafia character in a comic
book series. 76 These decisions indicate the challenges courts face
when applying the right of publicity doctrine to cases where expres-
sion and commercial speech intertwine, implicating the First Amend-
ment. The concomitant broadening of the doctrine to include use not
traditionally considered commercial demonstrates that a rearticula-
tion of the rationale underlying the doctrine should strongly limit the
doctrine's potential encroachment on protected expression. 77 The
broader the scope of the right in expanding the concept beyond
name, likeness, and signature, the more likely its potential infringe-
ment on freedom of speech concerns.7 8
2. Expansion of the Right of Publicity: First Amendment Concerns
Doe v. TCI Cablevision79 illustrates a recent example of the doc-
trine's potential encroachment on protectable speech. In that case,
the defendant, a creator of "a dark and surreal fantasy"80 comic series
called "Spawn," used the name of former professional hockey player
Tony Twist to create the fictional character, "Anthony 'Tony Twist'
Twistelli. '' 81 The Missouri Supreme Court rejected the defendant's
First Amendment defense, adopting a test that weighed the expressive
rant used with license animatronic robotic figures based on actors' characters on the
Cheers TV show).
74. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 800-02, 810-12 (Cal.
2001) (holding under transformative test that an artist's charcoal sketch of the Three
Stooges violated the actors' right of publicity when printed on T-shirts or otherwise used
commercially).
75. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 441, 461, 463 (6th Cir. 2003) (reversing
summary judgment in favor of hip-hop group and finding that Rosa Parks could pursue
right of publicity claim for use of her name in title of song).
76. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 370-72 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (holding
former hockey player's right of publicity violated by defendant's use of his name for char-
acter in comic book series).
77. See Volokh, supra note 12, at 904-05 (opposing the right of publicity outside the
core commercial speech zone but providing observations as to how to better define a
broader right of publicity and challenge the doctrine's breadth).
78. See Westfall & Landau, supra note 28, at 95.
79. 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
80. Id. at 366 (internal quotations omitted).
81. Id. at 365-66.
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quality of the use of an individual's identity against its commercial
purpose.8 2 The test denies the'defendant a First Amendment defense
where an individual "literary device" has "little literary value [when]
compared to its commercial value."8 3 The court thus fouad that the
"metaphorical reference" to Twist's name had become "predomi-
nantly a ploy to sell comic books and related products rather than an
artistic or literary expression, and under these circumstances, free
speech must give way to the right of publicity. '8 4
While Doe v. TCI Cablevision may demonstrate an egregious exam-
ple of the expansion of the right of publicity on protected speech, the
White case itself presaged such an outcome. In White, the court dis-
missed the defendant's First Amendment parody defense, stating that
the advertisement's "spoof of Vanna White and Wheel of Fortune
[was] subservient and only tangentially related to the ad's primary
message: 'buy Samsung VCRs.'"85 But given legal precedents such as
Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets,8 6 in which the Sixth Circuit as-
serted that "a celebrity's legal right of publicity is invaded whenever
his identity is intentionally appropriated for commercial purposes,"8 7
such outcomes are not surprising. As evidenced by the courts' deci-
sions in the Twist and White cases, " [t] he ambiguous phrase 'appropri-
ated for commercial purposes' is subject to many interpretations. '" 88
The dissent in White forcefully stated that the majority in that de-
cision had overextended the doctrine beyond its necessary limits by
"erect[ing] a property right of remarkable and dangerous breadth."89
According to the dissent, the appellate panel's holding that a simple
evocation of "[a] celebrity's image in the public's mind"90 infringes on
the celebrity's right to publicity even without use of the "celebrity's
name, voice, signature or likeness,"91 and without implication that
"the celebrity endorses a product,"9 2 creates an "Orwellian notion"93
of intellectual property that "withdraws far more from the public do-
82. Id. at 374.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992), r'hg denied,
989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).
86. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
87. Id. at 837.
88. Welkowitz, supra note 16, at 74.
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main than prudence and common sense allow."94 By enabling celeb-
rity plaintiffs to bring "vague claims '9 5 of commercial "appropriation
of identity,"96 well-defined limited characteristics such as name, like-
ness, or voice disappear, increasing the likelihood of infringement on
protected speech. 97
As the Sixth Circuit noted in a subsequent opinion in which it
cited the White dissent and denied the celebrity plaintiffs claim,
"There is an inherent tension between the right of publicity and the
right of freedom of expression under the First Amendment."98 Refer-
ring to the expanded concept of persona upheld by the majority in
the White decision,99 the dissent starkly underlined the danger a
broadly construed property right in persona poses to protected
speech: "The intellectual property right created by the panel here has
none of [the] essential limitations: No fair use exception; no right to
parody; no idea-expression dichotomy. It impoverishes the public do-
main, to the detriment of future creators and the public at large."100
In light of this danger, courts have attempted to fashion various tests
that strike an appropriate balance between the right of publicity and
protected speech. 10 1 The result in Doe v. TCI Cablevision, however,
demonstrates the challenges courts continue to face when considering
whether a defendant's use of a celebrity's name constitutes a commer-
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1516.
96. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
97. Id. But see Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 868 F. Supp.
1266, 1275 (N.D. Okla. 1994) (allowing First Amendment parody defense to right of pub-
licity claim even when use is deemed "commercial"); C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v.
Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 505 F.3d 818, 822-23 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding
that information contained in fantasy baseball games and available in the public domain
protected by First Amendment).
98. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003).
99. 989 F.2d at 1514 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 1516.
101. See, e.g., Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808-10 (Cal.
2001) (establishing transformative use test to determine that when a defendant signifi-
cantly transforms a work, defendant is entitled to a First Amendment defense to plaintiffs
right of publicity claim); see also Kirby v. Sega of Am., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 615-17 (Ct.
App. 2006) (applying transformative test and denying plaintiff's claim for right of publicity
violation because defendant's video game character contained "sufficient expressive con-
tent to constitute a transformative work" (internal quotations omitted)). Commentators as
well as courts have addressed the need to properly balance the First Amendment against
the publicity right. For example, the Restatement contains a now well-settled exception for
newsworthiness that applies in right of publicity cases to news reporting, commentary, en-
tertainment, or works of fiction or nonfiction. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 47 cmt. a (1995); see also 2 McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 8:47.
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cial ploy to sell a product, or a form of creative expression. 0 2 The
intuitive force of the natural rights Lockean labor theory rationale un-
derlying the right's development, with its singular focus on protecting
the economic value of identity, has contributed to this challenge by
providing the rhetorical strength of the classical intellectual property
rationale as support for the right of publicity.10 3 Justified by the exclu-
sive property owner's right to exclude others from reaping where they
have not sown, the strength of the property rationale has thus sup-
ported the doctrine's expansion as the predominant normative ratio-
nale employed by courts and commentators in support of the broad
construction of a property right in persona. 10 4
B. The Right of Publicity as Intellectual Property: Natural Rights
Labor Theory
The notion of an intellectual property right, defined solely as an
economic interest in the exploitation of identity, is grounded prima-
rily in the natural law right to the fruit of one's labor.10 5 The Lockean
natural rights labor theory focuses on an individual's moral entitle-
ment to own the objects that have been mixed with (or are the fruits
of) his labor-commonly referred to as the labor-desert theory. 10 6 La-
bor theory also encompasses the related utilitarian incentive theory
which focuses on the common good.10 7 Both theories relate to the
102. 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003).
103. See McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 2:1 ("The natural rights of property justification is
an appeal to first principles of justice .... Perhaps nothing is so strongly intuited as the
notion that my identity is mine.., it is my property to control as I see fit."); Hughes, supra
note 24, at 297, 300 (asserting that "the Lockean explanation of intellectual property has
immediate intuitive appeal"); Palmer, supra note 38, at 45 ("Many defenses of intellectual
property rights are grounded in the natural law right to the fruit of one's labor.").
104. See McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 2:2 ("[T]he prevention of unjust enrichment is
'probably the most common judicial theory in favor of the right of publicity."') (quoting
Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA ENr. L. REv. 97
(1994)); McKenna, supra note 15, at 229-30 (asserting Lockean labor theory as endorsed
by majority of commentators); Westfall & Landau, supra note 28, at 82, 123 (discussing
development of publicity rights in connection with Lockean labor theory and asserting
rhetorical power of the "property syllogism" in expansion of right of publicity).
105. See Haemmerli, supra note 15, at 388; see also Palmer, supra note 38, at 45; Radin,
supra note 25, at 958.
106. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287-88 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690); see Hughes, supra note 24, at 305. Hughes explains that
this position holds "that when labor produces something of value to others-something
beyond what morality requires the laborer to produce-then the laborer deserves some
benefit for it." Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
107. Hughes, supra note 24, at 303 (explaining that labor theory's instrumental argu-
ment is based on a utilitarian foundation that justifies the promotion of labor-labor pro-
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well-known Lockean premise that an individual's labor gives rise to
that individual's claim of exclusive property rights:
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all
Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body
has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work
of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he
removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in,
he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is
his own, and thereby makes it his Property.0
8
Under a labor-desert theory, an individual is morally entitled to
"the fruits of his own industry free from unjustified interference."1 0 9
Under the related incentive theory, property rights exist because "rec-
ognizing the right to exclude others encourages individuals to expend
labor productively and ultimately enhances social welfare."' 1 0
1. Labor-Desert Theory
Lockean natural rights labor theory strongly emphasizes the
moral desert of the creator, inventor, or author:n 1 ' "He that had as
good left for his Improvement... ought not to meddle with what was
already improved by another's Labour: If he did, 'tis plain he desired
the benefit of another's Pains, which he had no right to . . "'112
From the moral entitlement to the fruits of one's labor flows the cor-
relative right to prevent others from benefiting from "another's
pains" ' 13 and "unjustly enriching themselves at the expense of an-
other's labor."' 1 4
The inaugural stage of publicity rights in the United States, which
followed the Second Circuit's decision to recognize an independent
motes the public good by rewarding "the unpleasantness of labor" with property because
"people must be motivated to perform labor"); see also Radin, supra note 25, at 958.
108. LocKE, supra note 106, at 287-88.
109. McKenna, supra note 15, at 251 (citations omitted).
110. Id. Palmer asserts that natural rights arguments and utilitarian arguments may be
considered closely related. Palmer, supra note 38, at 45 n.5. Natural rights theories usually
contain "buried utilitarian assumptions" that "concern human flourishing or the attain-
ment of a man's natural end." Id. According to Palmer, a sharp separation between natural
rights theory and utility, or the common good, would be foreign to a natural law theorist.
Id.
111. Palmer, supra note 38, at 51.
112. LocKE, supra note 106, at 291. As Tom G. Palmer explains: "When one has im-
proved what was before unimproved (or created what before did not exist), one is entitled
to the result of one's labor. One deserves it." Palmer, supra note 38, at 51.
113. LocKE, supra note 106, at 291.
114. Gordon, supra note 14, at 1582; Dogan & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1181 (describ-
ing the "flip sides of the Lockean coin: the asserted rights to the fruits of one's labor and
protection against unjust enrichment").
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right of publicity claim,' 15 also famously heralded the use of labor-
desert theory as the right's fundamental justification.1 16 Melville Nim-
mer, in one of the most influential articles advocating ajudicially-cre-
ated right of publicity,' 17 explicitly employed the labor theory
rationale in support of his proposition that it is a "first principle of
Anglo-American jurisprudence, an axiom of the most fundamental na-
ture, that every person is entitled to the fruit of his labors." 18 Nimmer
asserted as unquestionable the assumption that "in most instances a
person achieves publicity values of substantial pecuniary worth only
after he has expended considerable time, effort, skill, and even
money."1 19 Without such a right, persons who had "long and labori-
ously nurtured the fruit of publicity values" 120 would be "deprived" of
their right "to control and profit from the publicity values which
[they] ha[ve] created or purchased."' 2 1
The Supreme Court subsequently echoed this reasoning in its
only decision thus far on the right of publicity. 122 In that case, not
only did the Court utilize an explicit labor-desert theory justification
for the right, but it also employed the related incentive theory to find
that the plaintiffs right of publicity had been violated.'
2 3
2. Incentive Theory
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Company,124 Zacchini, a
circus artist, performed as a "human cannonball." 25 A local broad-
casting company videotaped his performance and broadcasted the en-
tire fifteen-second performance as part of its evening news program
115. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
116. See MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 1:27; McKenna, supra note 15, at 250 n.117.






122. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). Zacchint is not gener-
ally understood to constitute a typical right of publicity case because it deals with the use of
the plaintiff's performance as opposed to the more typical use of a person's identity for its
identification value. See McCarthy, supra note 49, at 133. Nonetheless, as the only Supreme
Court case yet to consider the right of publicity, Zacchini has been influential in spurring
interest in using the right of publicity by attorneys and judges. See Welkowitz, supra note 16,
at 71.
123. Zacchzni, 433 U.S. at 573, 576.
124. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
125. Id. at 563.
PERSONA IN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXTWinter 2008]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
without Zacchini's consent. 1 26 In holding that the broadcasting com-
pany violated Zacchini's right of publicity, the Court noted that the
distinctive aspect of the right of publicity is that it protects "the propri-
etary interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage such
entertainment."12 7 Utilizing the labor theory rationale, the Court up-
held Zacchini's right of publicity against defenses based on First
Amendment privilege, stating that the right of publicity was one "fo-
cusing on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his endeav-
ors."1 28 The court explicitly stated the state's interest in permitting a
right of publicity was thus "closely analogous to the goals of patent
and copyright law." 129
In considering the incentive theory, the Court emphasized that
the broadcast of Zacchini's entire performance "pose [d] a substantial
threat to the economic value of [his] performance." 130 The broadcast
thus went "to the heart of [Zacchini]'s ability to earn a living as an
entertainer," 131 constituting an "appropriation of the very activity by
which [Zacchini] acquired his reputation in the first place."13 2 The
Court stated:
The rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] is the straight-
forward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good
will. No social purpose is served by having the defendant get free
some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for
which he would normally pay. 13 3
The Supreme Court's decision in Zacchini helped establish the
right as a property right grounded in Lockean labor theory.13 4
Zacchin's focus on the incentive approach to the right of publicity,
justified by analogy to patent and copyright law, has contributed to
the "fixation on the right as exclusively pecuniary," at the expense of
other important interests integral to the protection of identity. 135
Since Zacchini, the right has continued to expand and develop based
primarily on the Lockean labor rationale13 6 with the related preven-
126. Id. at 563-64.
127. Id. at 573.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 575.
131. Id. at 576.
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting Harry Kalven Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 251, 326, 331 (1966)) (internal quotations omitted).
134. See, e.g., Haemmerli, supra note 15, at 402-03.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., McFarland v. E & K Corp., No. 4-89-727, 1991 WL 13728, at *2 (D. Minn.
Jan. 17, 1991) ("A celebrity's identity, embodied in his name, likeness, and other personal
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tion of unjust enrichment serving as "the most common judicial the-
ory in favor of the right of publicity."' 13
7
C. Labor Theory Critique
Critics have viewed the right of publicity's expansion as a result of
this economic fixation on commercial value and the underlying Lock-
ean labor theory that has predominantly justified its development. 138
Classifying the right of publicity as a traditional intellectual property
right enables courts to shortchange their analysis by avoiding a careful
determination of the right's proper scope and the interests implicated
by publicity claims. 139 Beyond rhetorically employing the "property"
label, courts often offer little justification for the claim, as if the label
itself determines the scope of protection persona should be
granted. 140 Without the inherent limitations accorded traditional in-
tellectual property rights, the right of publicity has no limiting mecha-
nism that would require a more careful and thoughtful analysis.1 4 ' To
the extent a court deems a defendant's use a commercial exploitation
of the plaintiff's identity, an "invocation of commerciality" substitutes
for a careful examination of other factors that might permit the de-
fendant's use of a celebrity's identity.' 42 Following from this view,
some critics argue the expansion of the right and its encroachment on
protected speech as not surprising, but predictable.'
43
characteristics, is the 'fruit of his labor' and becomes a type of property entitled to legal
protection." (quoting Uhlaender v. Henrickson, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn.
1970))); see also McKenna, supra note 15, at 229-30; Madow, supra note 20, at 181.
137. McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 2:2 (quoting Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of
the Right of Publicity, I UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97, 109 (1994)).
138. See McKenna, supra note 15, at 233; Madow, supra note 20, at 181-82.
139. See McKenna, supra note 15, at 246-47.
140. See id. (citing Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazetti Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298,
326 (6th Cir. 2001) ("We believe that the weight of authority indicates that the right of
publicity is more properly analyzed as a property ight and, therefore, is descendible."); see
also 2 McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 10.8. McCarthy counsels against the application of labels
without thought:
The right of publicity is "property." From that label flows a plethora of legal cate-
gorizations and conclusions, but Justice Cardozo warned us to beware of "the tyr-
anny of labels." The word "property" is merely a convenient label and should not
be viewed as a magic substitute for thought. AsJudge Jerome Frank cautioned in
the seminal Haelan case, "Whether [the right of publicity] be labeled a "property"
right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag "property" simply symbol-
izes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has a pecuniary worth."
Id.
141. See Welkowitz, supra note 16, at 87-88 (discussing lack of limitations in publicity
law unlike other areas of intellectual property).
142. Id. at 95.
143. See McKenna, supra note 15, at 233.
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1. The Right of Publicity: Non-Celebrities
In addition to contributing to the right's expansionist tendencies,
the natural rights labor theory of publicity rights does not serve as a
coherent rationale for the outcome of many decisions, despite its pre-
dominance.' 4 4 In particular, an economic rationale grounded in natu-
ral rights labor theory does not justify why someone other than a
celebrity should have publicity rights. 145 Despite the majority view that
the "[t]he right of publicity is not merely a legal right of the 'celeb-
rity,' but is a right inherent to everyone to control the commercial use
of identity and persona," 14 6 the Lockean labor theory rationale does
not support this assertion.147 To be morally justified in claiming prop-
erty rights under Lockean theory, an individual must purposely have
directed efforts to achieve an intended result. 148 Lockean property
rights arise and persist only through productive use. 1 49 Even if it were
true that celebrities themselves have "achieve[d] publicity values of
substantial pecuniary worth"'150 after having expended "considerable
time, effort, skill and even money"1 5 1 in creating their public per-
sonas, 15 2 this provides little explanatory support for non-celebrities.
153
Unknown individuals may suddenly find their identity commercially
exploited by enterprising advertisers, although they themselves ex-
pended no effort in purposefully developing their public image.
154
Despite the incoherence of the labor rationale in justifying why
everyone is morally entitled to benefit from a right of publicity, many
courts clearly apply the right of publicity to protect the rights of non-
144. See Haemmerli, supra note 15, at 388-89.
145. See McKenna, supra note 15, at 264.
146. MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 1:3; see also id. § 4:16.
147. McKenna, supra note 15, at 264-65.
148. Id. at 255-56.
149. See LocKE, supra note 106, at 290-91. "Aimless effort is not labor.... Most impor-
tant from the perspective of the laborer's claim . . . is the laborer's purposiveness."
Gordon, supra note 14, at 1547. As Gordon explains: "A stranger's taking of another's
labored-on objects is likely to merit legal intervention only if the taking interferes with a
goal or project to which the laborer has purposely directed her effort." Id. Accordingly,
Gordon asserts that the scope of the laborer's purpose defines the scope of the rights she
can assert. Id. at 1548.
150. Nimmer, supra note 117, at 216.
151. Id.
152. But see Madow, supra note 20, at 181-82. Madow argues that Lockean labor analy-
sis is inappropriate because the right of publicity incorrectly ascribes exclusive rights to the
creation of a persona which rightly belongs to the public domain; celebrity persona is a
social construct that reflects the public's interest in the creation of cultural symbols that do
not belong to the celebrity, but rather to the public at large. Id.
153. See McKenna, supra note 15, at 264-65.
154. Id.
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celebrities. One example of this is a case involving a relatively un-
known kindergarten teacher and former model, who successfully as-
serted his statutory right of publicity after discovering that his face had
been used without his knowledge or consent on millions of Taster's
Choice instant coffee labels. 155 Although the plaintiff was not a celeb-
rity, the court found that the right of publicity allowed him to protect
his identity from commercial exploitation by Nestle. 156 The court al-
luded to the incentive theory rationale for the right of publicity by
prominently citing Zacchini157 for the proposition that "no social pur-
pose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the
plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would nor-
mally pay."'158
In discussing the development of the right of publicity, the court
also stated that "[t]he right of publicity protects the very identity or
persona of the plaintiff as a human being."1 59 Other decisions uphold-
ing non-celebrities' claims for appropriation of their proprietary inter-
est in their persona have included the use of a plaintiff's picture of
himself and his family in real estate advertisements, 160 the inclusion of
video clips of a carpenter installing tiles in a television commercial, 61
as well as a twenty-year old photograph of a former Vietnam veteran
presented in a promotional brochure for a publisher's multi-volume
series on the Vietnam experience. 162 A coherentjustification for these
claims does not ultimately rest on the basis of the labor the individual
has exerted in developing his or her persona or the social good that is
served by incentivizing the plaintiffs' claims. Rather, the strength of
these claims depends on a more fundamental basis: the recognition of
the right every individual possesses to control the use of his or her
persona-a right more justifiably based on the concept of individual
autonomy.
A similar analysis applies to cases where the celebrities themselves
have not created the persona the defendant exploits, but nonetheless
155. See, e.g., Christoff v. Nestle USA, Inc., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 126-28, 140-41 (Ct.
App. 2007), rev'g on other grounds, 169 P.3d 888 (Cal. 2007); see alsoJeffreyJ. Brown, Com-
ment, Defending the Right of Publicity: A Natural Rights Perspective, 10 IN-FELL. PROP. L. BULL.
131, 136 (2006).
156. Christoff 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 140-41.
157. Id. at 125.
158. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
159. Christoff 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 130 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)).
160. Canessa v. JI. Kislak, Inc., 235 A.2d 62, 75-76 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967).
161. Ainsworth v. Century Supply Co., 693 N.E.2d 510, 511-12, 514 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
162. Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904, 905-06, 914 (D.N.J. 1986).
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benefit from the right to recoup the loss of the commercial appropria-
tion. 163 Thus in White, the court stated that "[t]he law protects the
celebrity's sole right to exploit this value whether the celebrity has
achieved her fame out of rare ability, dumb luck, or a combination
thereof."164 As these cases demonstrate, courts may not require that
individuals have purposefully directed their efforts towards the crea-
tion of their persona, nor made previous commercial use of their
identity, in order to claim a right of publicity. The Tellado v. Time-Life
Books, Inc. decision, 165 in particular, indicates the extent to which the
autonomy rationale better supports these types of claims by incorpo-
rating both personal and economic interests, rather than the exclusive
protection of proprietary interests the Lockean labor theory ostensibly
provides. In Tellado, the plaintiff brought suit based on the emotional
trauma he experienced when he first discovered his picture on the
publisher's promotional materials, even though the court granted his
claim on the defendant's commercial appropriation of his likeness. 166
As Alice Haemmerli, the former Assistant Dean for Transnational Cur-
ricula Development at Columbia Law School, states: by "defining the
right of publicity as a strictly economic property right.., the right of
publicity lost a crucial part of its raison d'etre as a right based on, and
protective of, personal autonomy. '167
2. The Right of Publicity: Personal Interests
Decisions such as Tellado, in which courts consider both the per-
sonal and proprietary interests of the plaintiff, support a rearticula-
tion of a publicity right based on autonomy rather than a Lockean
labor theory natural rights rationale. In Waits, the Ninth Circuit
awarded the plaintiff two million dollars in punitive damages because
the singer had expressly refused any commercialization of his image
through product advertising due to "his philosophy that musical art-
ists should not do commercials because it detracts from their artistic
integrity.' 68 By using a sound-alike for the commercial, the court
163. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992),
r'hg denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).
164. Id. at 1399; see also Madow, supra note 20, at 181-82.
165. 643 F. Supp. at 914.
166. Id. at 906, 914; see Lapter, supra note 7, at 269-70 (asserting that in some jurisdic-
tions, based on this precedent, private individuals, unlike celebrities, retain a cause of ac-
tion for reputational and commercial harm arising out of the commercial use of their
identity).
167. Haemmerli, supra note 15, at 408-09.
168. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1992).
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found that Frito-Lay had misappropriated Waits's voice, damaging his
reputation "by making him an apparent hypocrite."'169 Although the
defendants had argued that in right of publicity actions, only damages
to compensate for economic injury were available, the court dis-
agreed, awarding Waits two million dollars in damages for injury to
personal interests causing humiliation, embarrassment, and mental
distress. 170
Similarly in White, the plaintiff may have been concerned with
protecting her reputation as much as complaining of an economic
misappropriation: 17 the use of the robot in the defendant's advertise-
ment implied a denigration of the plaintiff as an individual by implic-
itly conveying the idea that her role as a game show host could be
played by a robot mechanically spinning letters on a game-board. 72
In this way, courts implicitly recognize that celebrities may care about
more than simply the loss of remuneration for the commercial ex-
ploitation of their identities. 1 73
3. The Autonomy-Based Theory
Despite the inconsistencies inherent in the labor theory ratio-
nale, its normative appeal in providing a moral justification for the
right of publicity has proved extremely appealing to both commenta-
tors and judges alike. 174 The labor theory rationale, however, born of
an era when Hollywood studios invested considerable efforts in devel-
oping celebrity identities,1 75 makes little sense today, given the explo-
169. Id. at 1103.
170. Id.; see also Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 416 (9th Cir. 1996)
(accepting plaintiff's claim for emotional injury resulting from an unauthorized use of his
name). The fifteen million dollars in damages granted in the Twist case may also suggest
that the court recognized the implicit denigration of the plaintiffs identity that the defen-
dant's appropriation seemed to imply. See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 366
(Mo. 2003) (depicting plaintiffs fictional cartoon character as a "Mafia don whose list of
evil deeds includes multiple murders, abduction of children and sex with prostitutes" with
defendant referring to hockey player as a renowned enforcer, i.e., "goon"); Brinkley v.
Casablancas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1012 (App. Div. 1981) (awarding damages for injury to
property interest as well as emotional distress under New York statute).
171. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992), r'hg
denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (comparing Vanna White in appearance and conduct
to a robot that turned letters on game-board).
172. Id. at 1396, 1399; Welkowitz, supra note 16, at 98.
173. See Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (describing actor
Cary Grant's assertion that no one, including himself, should profit by the publicity value
of his name and reputation).
174. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
175. See Nimmer, supra note 117, at 203 ("But although the concept of privacy which
Brandeis and Warren evolved fulfilled the demands of Beacon Street in 1890, it may seri-
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sion of new media technologies and enterprising new advertising
techniques that may exploit the identity value associated with any indi-
vidual simply because a particular consumer has bought a specific
product or has visited a particular web-site.1 76 Cases where the courts
have considered the plaintiffs' personal and proprietary interests indi-
cate that the right protects more than the plaintiffs' economic rights
against commercial exploitation of their personas.177
At its most fundamental, the right of publicity protects every
human being's inherent right to control the commercial use of iden-
tity, 178 not because of the labor invested in creating that identity, but
because of the individual interest in autonomy in determining how
persona is to be displayed to the world.179
On this view, the proper focus of the right should be the person,
not the work product. 180 Because identity appropriation infringes in-
dividuals' control as to the use of their persona, and consequently
their interest in "autonomous self-definition,"181 a theory based on the
autonomy of the person better supports a unifying rationale for a pub-
licity right that encompasses both economic and moral objections to
that infringement.1 8 2 This approach recognizes that the individual's
complaint is not only that the objectification of identity is harmful, or
that its exploitation represents a commercial loss, but rather, more
fundamentally, that the individual has lost control over which uses are
made of his or her identity.' 83 As Professor Mark McKenna explains:
"Since all individuals share the interest in autonomous self-definition,
every individual should be able to control uses of her identity that
ously be doubted that the application of this concept satisfactorily meets the needs of
Broadway and Hollywood in 1954.").
176. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
177. See supra Part I.C.2.
178. See MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 1:3.
179. SeeJuLIus C.S. PINCKAERS, FROM PRIVACy TOWARD A NEW INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY
RIGHT IN PERSONA 242 (1996) ("From the principle of personal autonomy it follows that
every human being should have the right to develop his own identity and to decide how
and what aspects of this personal identity will be shown to the rest of the world.").
180. See Haemmerli, supra note 15, at 402-03.
181. See McKennna, supra note 15, at 285.
182. See Haemmerli, supra note 15, at 422. Haemmerli advocates a Kantian autonomy-
based property right rationale for publicity rights. See id. at 413-22. While much of Haem-
merli's analysis applies to the discussion of Kantian personality rights below, personality
rights based on a Kantian theory do not constitute property. See znfta Part II; see also McK-
enna, supra note 15, at 283 (advocating a publicity right based on the individual's interest
in autonomous self-definition).
183. McKenna, supra note 15, at 283.
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interfere with her ability to define her public character."184 Because
such use curtails the individual's fundamental freedom to choose how
to present his or her public persona to the world, commercial appro-
priation that implicates an individual's "legitimate interest in autono-
mous self-definition" constitutes a violation of individuals' right to
publicity regardless of the degree or nonexistence of their fame.' 8 5
A focus on the actual person behind the persona highlights the
personal interest implicated in the right. This focus has the potential
to restrict the doctrine significantly by circumscribing the realm of
identity indicia to those characteristics within the more direct, per-
sonal sphere of the plaintiff.'8 6 The closer the particular use of a like-
ness to the "personal sphere" of the individual, the less the likelihood
that cases involving evocative indicia of identity implicating creative
or parodic expression will constitute infringement.18 7 However, cases
involving images, voice, and other immediately identifiable personal
attributes of an individual would fall in the personal attributes cate-
gory and would justify decisions such as Waits138 or Midler'89 where the
defendant appropriated the sound of the plaintiff's actual voice. At-
tributes evoking identity however, such as those at issue in White g° or
in Carson,191 would be less likely to fall within the ambit of this more
narrowly construed personal sphere. 192 As will be discussed more fully
below, this restriction is consonant with the Kantian theory underlying
German personality rights, which similarly limit actionable attributes
of infringement to those directly and immediately identifying the
plaintiff. 193
184. Id. at 285.
185. See PINCKAERS, supra note 179, at 242; McKenna, supra note 15, at 231.
186. See David W. Melville & Harvey S. Perlman, Protection for Works of Authorship
Through the Law of Unfair Competition: Right of Publicity and Common Law Copyright Reconsid-
ered, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 363, 398 (1998) (advocating a restriction on the right of publicity
limited to when the indicia of identity appropriated by the defendant are within the direct
personal sphere of the plaintiff).
187. See supra Part I.A.1.
188. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
189. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
190. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992), r'hg
denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993); see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d at
1514 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
191. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836-37 (6th Cir.
1983).
192. See Haemmerli, supra note 15, at 460-64; see also Melville & Perlman, supra note
186, at 398.
193. See infra Part II.B.3.
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A focus on the individual's autonomy and integrity not only em-
phasizes moral as well as economic interests but also lessens courts'
tendency to apply the formalist conception of property to the right
that has accompanied the right's expansion.' 94 While it would seem
plausible that an analysis which pits a plaintiff's commercial interest in
advertising royalties against societal interests in free expression would
tip the scales in favor of the public, this has not been the case.' 95
Rather, courts have found in favor of the plaintiffs exclusive right to
the commercial use of his or her identity, holding that as an intellec-
tual property right, the right of publicity constitutes a weighty prop-
erty claim that trumps other interests. 196 This argument is well-
supported by analogy to the Anglo-American tradition of real prop-
erty rights. 197 However, this traditional approach ignores the critical
differences between a property right in human persona and other
forms of intangible property such as patents and copyright.198 An au-
tonomy-based sui generis publicity right references the tradition of
balancing of the interests integral to the tort of privacy while provid-
ing a counterbalance to the rhetorical appeal of the property claim.' 99
At a minimum, a right based on personal autonomy compels a more
thoughtful balancing of the interests involved and allows a more flexi-
ble approach to better accommodate competing interests, 20 0 spurred
194. See McKenna, supra note 15, at 246-47; see also Westfall & Landau, supra note 28, at
72-73.
195. See supra Parts I.A.1, I.A.2.
196. Even courts that explicitly address the tension between the right of publicity and
First Amendment concerns fall prey to this approach. See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v.
Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001) ("Although surprisingly few courts have
considered in any depth the means of reconciling the right of publicity and the First
Amendment, we follow those that have in concluding that depictions of celebrities
amounting to little more than the appropriation of the celebrity's economic value are not
protected expression under the First Amendment.").
197. Palmer, supra note 38, at 45-46.
198. These differences include not only the lack of restrictions on the right typical of
the limitations inherent to patents and copyright, see supra note 16 and accompanying text,
but encompass more importantly, the fundamental distinction that "[h]uman beings are
intrinsically tied to their public identity, into which they have projected a part of their
personality, their very 'selves.'" PINCKAERS, supra note 179, at 243.
199. See 2 McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 8:32 (citation omitted) (internal quotations omit-
ted) (suggesting that the interest to be weighed against freedom of speech in right of
publicity cases is not so much the property interest but rather the privacy interest).
200. See id. (stating that in balancing expression and commercial use in right of public-
ity cases in borderline cases, the court should ideally focus on exactly what is alleged to be
the "message" of the defendant's use, and that the strength of the publicity claim "will wax
or wane depending upon the relationship between defendants' message and plaintiff's
identity").
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by greater sensitivity to the context in which the use occurs and the
different situations in which right of publicity claims arise.
4. Autonomy-Based Theory and Privacy
A publicity right based on personal autonomy that focuses on the
individual's right to control the use of his or her identity accounts for
the intuitive force publicity rights exert. Even outspoken critics of the
right concede that "[t]he right of publicity may seem intuitively ap-
pealing to many people."20 1 The autonomy-based approach incorpo-
rates personal rights consistent with the right's origins in privacy,
when courts initially recognized an interest in autonomous self-defini-
tion.202 This approach is very similar to the theory informing German
copyright law that underlies aspects of German personality rights.20 3
In Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance,20 4 the defendant used
the plaintiff's photograph for a life insurance advertisement without
the plaintiffs permission. 205 The advertisement suggested Pavesich
had secured life insurance from the company. 20 6 The court held that
the defendant's use violated Pavesich's privacy, stating that "[t]he
form and features of [Pavesich] are his own. . . .Nothing appears
from which it is to be inferred that [he] has waived his right to deter-
mine himself where his picture should be displayed in favor of the
advertising right of the defendants."20 7 In its reasoning, the court rec-
ognized the plaintiffs right to control the commercial placement and
201. Volokh, supra note 12, at 929; see also Haemmerli, supra note 15, at 429 ("Perhaps
it is because there is so much intuitive force to the notion of control over the use of one's
own identity that commentators like Professor McCarthy have asserted that the right of
publicity is 'self-evident.'" (citation omitted)).
202. McKenna, supra note 15, at 283; see also McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 1:7. Such a
focus on personal interest would also conform to a better understanding of the right. Id.
According to McCarthy, it may well be "more accurate to think of [the right of publicity] as
a sui generis mixture of personal rights, property rights, and rights under the law of unfair
competition than to attempt, Proscrustean-like [sic], to fit it precisely into one of those
categories." Id. (quoting S.J. Hoffman, Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28 BULL. COPY-
RIGHT Soc'v 111, 112 (1980) (internal quotations omitted)). A right of publicity based on
autonomy would also comprise an individual's decision to transfer the right, the issue that
initially provoked the necessity for an independent publicity right separate from privacy.
Id.; see Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
203. See infra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2.
204. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
205. Id. at 68.
206. Id. at 68-69.
207. Id. at 79.
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the use of his photograph, 20 8 describing how if he saw "his picture
displayed in places where he would never go to be gazed upon, at
times when and under circumstances where if he were personally pre-
sent the sensibilities of his nature would be severely shocked."20 9
The Pavesich decision upheld the plaintiffs right of privacy 210 and
in doing so explicitly endorsed 211 the seminal Warren and Brandeis
article 212 that is credited with the creation of the doctrine, published
fifteen years before Pavesich was decided. 21 3 It has long been estab-
lished that Warren and Brandeis's The Right to Privacy214 has had a
tremendous and lasting impact on the development of the privacy
doctrine. 215 Less discussed is the continental influence that shaped
the doctrine, in particular, the German philosophical tradition under-
lying the development of continental intellectual and artistic prop-
erty.216 Given this influence, however, the emphasis the Pavesich court
placed on the plaintiffs right to define where and how his photo-
graph should be displayed-how his picture would be "gazed upon"-
is not surprising, because the Pavesich court's approach echoes the
then developing conception of personality embodied in German cop-
yright law:2 17 the right to "a public image of our own making, as the
right to control our public face." 218 The concept of "inviolate person-
208. Id. at 80. According to the court, "as long as the advertiser uses him for these
[advertising] purposes, he cannot be otherwise than conscious of the fact that he is for the
time being under the control of another, [and] that he is no longer free."
209. Id. at 80 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
210. Id. at 81.
211. Id. at 74.
212. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193,
205 (1890).
213. McCARTHY, supra note 9, §§ 1:11, 1:17.
214. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 212.
215. McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 1:14.
216. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
YALE L.J. 1151, 1205-08 (2004). Whitman asserts that Warren and Brandeis pursued a Ger-
man approach to the law of personality which drew on the roman civil law of insult and on
intellectual and artistic property-Urheberrecht. Id. German writers had held that privacy
functioned as a limitation on property and constituted an evolutionary outgrowth of the
growing sensitivity to the needs of "personality." Id. Warren and Brandeis echoed these
ideas in claiming that primitive ideas of property would cease as the common law evolved
to protect not only mere material "property rights" but also the immaterial damage of
emotional and moral injuries. Id.
217. See PINCKAERS, supra note 179, at 242-44 (asserting that the personality interest in
controlling how and what aspects of one's personal identity will be shown to the world is
found in German copyright law); see also infra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2.
218. Whitman, supra note 216, at 1168. Whitman states that Warren and Brandeis's
idea of privacy concerned the right to "a public image of our own making, as the right to
control our public face" similar to the set of continental rights over the control of one's
[Vol. 42
PERSONA IN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT
ality,"219 which grounds Warren and Brandeis's conception of the
right of privacy, has direct intellectual-historical ties to the German
concept of personality rights evolving at that time.220
Given this history, it is not surprising that the theory of an auton-
omy-based publicity right strongly resembles the theories underlying
German personality rights, 22 1 and in particular, the philosophy of Im-
manuel Kant, one of the key theorists of the concept of personality in
Germany. 222 Legal scholars in the United States have stimulated much
of the right of publicity's doctrinal evolution and have had "extraordi-
nary impact on the development of the law."2 2 3 Should this degree of
influence continue, critics advocating a rearticulation of the right
based on autonomy theory would do well to consider the theoretical
principles underlying personality rights in Germany.224 To that end, a
brief examination of the primary theory underlying German personal-
ity rights and recent developments in German personality law will be
explored below.
image, name, and reputation. Id. at 1167-68. For this reason, Warren and Brandeis, among
other American theorists, insisted on a connection between privacy and personhood. Id. at
1168.
219. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 212, at 205.
220. Whitman, supra note 216, at 1207-08. McKenna describes the origins of the doc-
trine thus: Warren and Brandeis claimed that a number of cases purportedly decided on
other grounds, such as breach of trust or common-law copyright, actually represented ef-
forts to protect an author's expressions of her thoughts and feelings-elements of person-
ality that Warren and Brandeis believed should be recognized separately and protected
directly. McKenna, supra note 15, at 234. By focusing most of their attention on unpub-
lished works of authorship, Warren and Brandeis looked to protect such works on the basis
of common law claims of "originality" as the true grounds of "the tide of the property." Id.
at 235 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). Since originality was a matter of
expressing the mind of a creator or originator, personal appearance, sayings, acts, and
personal relations were similar expressions of personality which Warren and Brandeis sug-
gested the law should protect as well. Id. This "right to privacy," the general "right to be let
alone," when considered with all of its applications, constituted "in reality not the principle
of private property, but that of an inviolate personality." Id. (quoting Warren & Brandeis,
supra note 212, at 193-95, 205 (internal quotations omitted)).
221. See infra Part II.
222. See infra Part II. Interestingly, critics who advocate autonomy-based theories have
cited Kant in support, but do not explicitly address the historical intellectual connection.
See, e.g., Haemmerli, supra note 15, at 413-22; McKenna, supra note 15, at 287 (describing
the interest in autonomous self-definition as similar to the interest Kant believed was impli-
cated by the counterfeiting of books).
223. McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 1:4.
224. For example, the desirability of explicitly including moral and personal rights
within an international right of publicity has not gone unnoticed. See, e.g., Grant, supra
note 8, at 562 (stating that to be most effective, a new internationally-recognized right of
publicity must embrace both the traditional American economic rationales for the right,
based on the commercial value of the persona, and the social values of the right which
derive from the idea of personal autonomy and moral rights).
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II. German Personality Rights
German law protects against the unauthorized use of an individ-
ual's identity, although "no distinct right of publicity exists that is
comparable to that in the U.S." 225 German courts have decided cases
concerning the commercial appropriation of personality since the
early twentieth century.226 A much broader right in Germany protects
a person's commercial interests, a general right of personality, that
has developed primarily by case law.227 As in the United States, legal
scholars have greatly influenced the development of the right as it has
evolved from its antecedents in Roman civil law through the jurispru-
dence of legal theorists influenced by the idealist philosophy of Im-
manuel Kant.228
Because of these origins, the right of personality in Germany does
not constitute an intellectual property right, but rather a personal
right.22 9 It guarantees the protection of human dignity and the right
to freely develop one's personality. 230 Strongly based as it is on a Kant-
ian theory of individual autonomy and freedom, 231 the general per-
225. Bergmann, supra note 37, at 500.
226. Huw BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., PRIVACY, PERSONALITY AND PROPERT. CIVIL LAW PER-
SPECrIVES ON COMMERCIAL APPROPRIATION 94 (2005). In 1910, the famous aviator, Count
Zeppelin, prevented the unauthorized registration of his name and portrait as a trademark
for tobacco. Reichsgericht [RG] [Federal Court of Justice 1880-1945] Oct. 28, 1910, 74
Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen [RGZ] 308 (312) (F.R.G.) (Graf
Zeppelin) [Count Zeppelin].
227. See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 25, 1954, 13
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 334 (338) (F.R.G.) (Leser-
briej) [Reader's Letter], translated in BASIL S. MARKESINIS, A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION TO
THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS 378, 414 (4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter MARRESINIs, A COMPARA-
TIVE INTRODUCTION] (recognizing that "the general personality right must be regarded as a
constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right" in private law); see also BEVERLY-SMITH ET
AL., supra note 226, at 10, 100-01 (stating that many commentators considered thejudici-
ary's decision "to take the lead in a disputed question" not yet decided by the legislature a
"bold judgment").
228. See BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., supra note 226, at 96-97.
229. Bergmann, supra note 37, at 520.
230. See, e.g., BGH Dec. 1, 1999, 143 BGHZ 214 (218) (F.R.G.) (Marlene Dietrich 1),
translated in BASIL S. MARKESINIS, ESSAYS ON FOREIGN LAW AND COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY
401, 407 (2001) [hereinafter MARKESINIS, COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY] ("[The general
right of personality] guarantees as against all the world the protection of human dignity
and the right to free development of the personality.").
231. EDWARDJ. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTyy: CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANY AND
THE UNITED STATES 62 (2002); see RODIGER KLUBER, PERSONLICHKEITSSCHUTZ UND KOM-
MERZALISIERUNG; DIE JURISTISCH-6KONOMISCHEN GRUNDLAGEN DES SCHUTZES DES VERMOGEN-
SWERTEN BESTANDTEILE DES ALLGEMEINEN PERSONLICHKEITSRECHTS [PERSONALITY
PROTECTION AND COMMERCIALIZATION: THEJUDIcIAL-EcONOMIC BASIS FOR THE PROTECTION
OF THE PROPRIETARY COMPONENTS OF THE GENERAL PERSONALITY RIGHT] 6, 40-44 (2007)
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sonality right constitutes a personal right, integral to the self, which
cannot be alienated. 232 On the one hand, this underlying theory struc-
tures the scope of the right, providing an instructive example of how
publicity rights based on autonomy theory in the United States might
restrict the expansion the right of publicity has undergone since its
inception as a separate intellectual property right, distinct from pri-
vacy.2 3 3 On the other hand, the issues German courts have encoun-
tered in confronting the restriction on alienability, for example,
illustrate the necessity of a limited propertization of personality rights
for modern commercial markets234 and thus affirms the desirability of
a sui generis approach to publicity rights in general. 233
A. Survey of the General Right of Personality in Germany
Most of the judgments concerning appropriation of personality
are based on the various specific personality rights recognized by Ger-
man law. 236 Section 12 of the Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch [Civil Code of
1900]237 ("BGB") prohibits the unauthorized use of another person's
name.238 Section 22 of the Kunstfirheberrechtsgesetz [Act on Copy-
right in Works of Visual Arts of 1907]239 ("KUG")provides that a per-
son's portrait may only be exhibited or disseminated with the
depicted person's consent.240 "[T] hese rights to one's name and to
one's image are known as 'specific personality rights' (besondere Per-
(discussing Kant and Hegel as key theorists in the development of natural rights protec-
tions of the German general personality right).
232. See, e.g., BGHZ 143, 214 (220) (Marlene Dietrich 1), translated in MARKESINIS, COM-
PARATIVE METHODOLOGY, supra note 230, at 408 ("Insofar as the rights of personality pro-
tect non-material interests, they are indissolubly bound to the person of the holder of them
and, as highly personal rights, are not renounceable and are inalienable, and are therefore
not transferable and not inheritable." (citing BGH Mar. 20, 1968, 50 BGHZ 133 (137)
(F.R.G.) (Mephisto))).
233. See infra Part II.A.
234. See infta Part II.B.5.
235. McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 1:7.
236. See infra Part II.B.
237. Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896, Reichsgesetzblatt
[RGBI] § 12, available at Gesetze im Internet, http://www.bundesrecht.juris.de. For a trans-
lation see http://www.bundesrecht.juris.de/Teilliste-translations.html (last visited Feb. 20.
2008).
238. Id.
239. Kunstfirheberrechtsgesetz [KUG] [Act on Copyright in Works of Visual Arts of
1907] § 22, available at Gesetze im Internet, http://bundesrecht.juris.de, translated in Copv-
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s6nlichkeitsrechte). '"241 Before the 1950s, these specific rights consti-
tuted the only legal protection of personality in Germany.
242
In 1954, the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court of Jus-
tice) ("BGH") supplemented these rights by recognizing a "general
personality right" (allgemeines Pers6nlichkeitsrecht) 243 which pro-
tects all other aspects of a personality against violation.244 The Court
stated that the "general personality right"245 must be regarded as a
constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right based on Articles 1 and
2 of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law of 1949) ("GG" or "Basic Law"). 246
This interest is further protected under section 823 I BGB. 247
The constitutional principles of the Basic Law embrace the re-
spect and protection of human dignity based on "the Kantian proposi-
tion that humans are to be treated always as ends in themselves, never
as means. '"248 "The free human person and his dignity are the highest
values of the constitutional order" which "[t] he state in all of its forms
is obliged to respect and defend. ' 249 This approach is based on the
conception of individuals as moral autonomous beings, endowed with
the freedom to determine and develop themselves. 250 The language
of Article 2 of the Basic Law describes this self-determination as di-
241. BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., supra note 226, at 94 (citingJORGEN HELLE, BESONDERE PER-
SONLICHKEITSRECHTE IN PRIVATRECHT [Specific Personality Rights in Private Law] 37
(1991)).
242. Id. at 94-95.
243. BGH May 25, 1954, 13 BGHZ 334 (338) (F.R.G.) (Leserbrief), translated in




247. BGB § 823(1), available at Gesetze im Internet, http://www.bundesrecht.juris.de.
For a translation, see www.bundesrecht.juris.de/Teilliste translations.html (last visited Feb.
20, 2008). Section 823(1) provides that damages can be recovered in the event wrongful
damage is caused to another's life, body, health, freedom, property or "other right." Id.
The court recognized a "general right to one's personality" under this "other right" within
the meaning of BGB section 823. SeeBGH Feb. 14, 1958, 26 BGHZ 349 (354-355) (F.R.G.)
(Herrenreiter) [Gentleman Rider], translated in MARKESINIS, A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION,
supra note 227, at 417-18.
248. Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American
Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963, 974.
249. Id. at 973 (citations omitted).
250. Id. at 973-74.
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rected toward "the free unfolding of personality"251 and integral to
the freedom of the self.252
The general right of personality applies when the specific statu-
tory provisions are not applicable. 253 The general right of personality
thus constitutes an umbrella right that protects different aspects of an
individual's personality from unauthorized public exposure and guar-
antees the protection of human dignity and the right to freely develop
one's personality-the right to autonomous self-definition. 254 Al-
though German courts apply the specific personality rights25 5 with pri-
ority, they consider on a case-by-case basis whether a specific statutory
rule applies, or whether the courts should apply the general personal-
ity right to cover gaps left by the specific statutes. 256
B. Survey of the General Right of Personality: Specific Personality
Rights
Two specific statutes protect against appropriation of personality:
section 12 of the Civil Code prohibits the unauthorized use of another
person's name257 and section 22 of the KUG [Act on Copyright in
251. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 2 (F.R.G), available at Gesetze im Internet,
http://bundesrecht.juris.de, translated in DAVID P. CURIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FED-
ERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 343-44 (1994). Article 2(1) guarantees that "[e]veryone has
the right to the free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights
of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law." Id. art. 2(1). Eberle
notes the importance of the language in this statute as denoting a personal right. "The
German phrasing in article 2 is Enfaltung, which connotes more an 'unfolding' like a bud
from a rose, than 'development,' which is translated as Entwicklung. Thus, German law is
really a focus on the 'free unfolding of personality' more than just self-realization con-
noted by 'development.'" EBERLE, supra note 231, at 61.
252. GG art. 2(1). Critics have noted the general and highly abstract nature of the
general personality right, asserting a reduction in legal certainty due to the right's vague
character. BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., supra note 226, at 113. However, several attempts to create
a more concrete right on a statutory basis have failed. Id. Supporters of the abstract nature
of the general personality right note that the "right is highly flexible, thereby allowing the
courts to react to new types of violation immediately without having to wait for new legisla-
tion." Id.
253. Bergmann, supra note 37, at 503.
254. See, e.g., Oberlandesgericht Hamburg [OLG Hamburg] [Hamburg Court of Ap-
peals] May 8, 1989, 1989 Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht [GRUR] 666 (666)
(F.R.G.) (Heinz Erhardt) (enjoining the impersonation of a famous actor's "characteristic
voice and speech patterns" under the general right of personality), translated in 21 IIC 881,
882 (1990); see also Bergmann, supra note 37, at 503; Daniel Biene, Celebrity Culture, Individ-
uality, and the Right of Publicity as a European Legal Issue, 36 IIC 505, 510 (2005).
255. See infra Part II.B.1.
256. BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., supra note 226, at 114.
257. BGB § 12. Section 12 provides:
If the right of a person to use a name is disputed by another person, or if the
interest of the person entitled to the name is injured by the unauthorised use of
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Works of Visual Arts of 1907] provides that a person's image may only
be exhibited or disseminated with the depicted person's consent.258
Most important for this discussion is the right to one's image. This
right bears the strongest resemblance to the theory of autonomy advo-
cated in the United States as an alternative rationale for the right of
publicity. 259
1. Specific Personality Rights-Right to One's Image
Section 22 of the KUG provides that pictures shall only be pub-
lished or presented to the general public with the consent of the de-
picted person.260 At approximately the same time as the Georgia court
in Pavesich endorsed Warren and Brandeis's theory of privacy261 in up-
holding a person's right to determine the presentation of one's image
to the world,262 the German legislature enacted a statutory right to
one's image by creating section 22 within the new copyright act, the
KUG.26 3 In creating section 22, the legislature responded to a case
involving two photographers who had unlawfully entered the room
where the corpse of the former German Chancellor Otto von Bismark
was lying in state, and had photographed the corpse. 264 Bismark's
heirs successfully applied for an order for destruction of the photo-
the same name by another person, the person entitled may require the other to
remove the infringement. If further infringements are to be feared, the person
entitled may seek a prohibitory injunction.
Id.
258. KUG § 22.
259. Legal scholars generally consider that section 12 of the Civil Code primarily re-
flects the influence of the Roman civil law of insult. See, e.g., Eric H. Reiter, Personality and
Patrimony: Comparative Perspectives on the Right to One's Image, 76 TUL. L. REV. 673, 676-77,
686-87 (2002). As such, its concerns are primarily reputational interests, and it does not
immediately reflect the Kantian theory of moral autonomy which explicitly underlies sec-
tion 22 KUG, except as supported by the general right of personality embodied in Articles
I and 2 of the Basic Law. Id. at 686-90.
260. KUG § 22. Section 22 provides:
Portraits may be distributed or publicly exhibited only with the consent of the
person portrayed. In case of doubt, the consent shall be presumed to have been
given when the person portrayed received a payment for allowing himself to be
portrayed. After the death of the person portrayed, the consent of the relatives of
such person shall be required during ten years following his death.
Id.
261. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins., 50 S.E. 68, 74 (Ga. 1905).
262. Id. at 79.
263. BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., supra note 226, at 99. SeeJORGEN HELLE, BESONDERE PERSON-
LICHKEITSRECHTE IM PRIVATRECHT [SPECIFIC PERSONALITY RIGHTS IN PRIVATE LAw] 45-46
(1991) (observing that section 22, from the date of its initial enactment in the KUG, was
considered a personality right).
264. RG Dec. 28, 1899, 45 RGZ 170 (170) (F.R.G.) (Bismark).
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graphs. 265 Although the legislature repealed most provisions of the
KUG in 1965, section 22 has remained in force. 266
Most significant for autonomy theorists of publicity rights in the
United States, section 22 constitutes a hybrid right protecting both
personal and economic interests. 267 In applying section 22 to both
personal and economic interests, German courts have interpreted sec-
tion 22 as modeled on German copyright law which similarly consti-
tutes a hybrid right.268 This monistic2 69 theory of copyright views the
author's right as a fundamentally personal right to determine when,
in what form, and for what purpose his creative work is to be commu-
nicated to the public. 270 On this view, intellectual works are integral to
an internal, personal sphere. 271 An author's right thus constitutes a
personality right, rather than a right of property.2 72 It is part of the
self-ownership that an individual has over oneself; economic interests
are necessarily subsumed within the personal sphere. 273 Thus, the
Federal Supreme Court has stated with respect to the right to one's
265. Id. at 174.
266. BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., supra note 226, at 99.
267. See BGHZ Dec. 1, 1999, 143 BGZH 214 (223) (Marlene Dietrich 1), translated in
MARKESINIS, COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY, supra note 230, at 408 (asserting that the general
personality right and specific personality rights such as the right to one's image and right
to one's name protect not only ideal, but also commercial personality interests); BEVERLY-
SMITH ET AL., supra note 226, at 108.
268. BGH May 8, 1956, 20 BGHZ 345 (353-54) (F.R.G.) (Paul Dahlke) (recognizing the
right to one's image as including a pecuniary exclusive right under section 22 ("verm6gen-
swertes Ausschliesslichkeitsrecht"), as the right to determine the commercial use of one's
image), construed in Horst-Peter G6tting, Vom Right of Privacy zum Right of Publicity: Die
Anerkennung eines Immaterialguterrechts an der eigenen Personlichkett im Amerikanischen Recht
[From the Right of Privacy to the Right of Publicity: The Recognition of an American
Intellectual Property Right in Personality], Gewerblicher Rechtschutz und Urheber-
recht-Internationaler Teil [GRUR-Int] [Industrial Property Law and Copyright Jour-
nal-International] 656, 667 (1995) (describing the judicial integration of commercial and
ideal interests encompassed by the general and specific personality rights in Paul Dahlke
under the monistic theory); BGHZ 143, 214 (226-27) (Marlene Dietrich 1), translated in
MARKESINIS, COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY, supra note 230, at 412 (analogizing the hybrid
right status of right of personality elements to that of copyright law); see also BEVERLY-SMITH
ET AL., supra note 226, at 10, 99, 108; PINCKAERS, supra note 179, at 242.
269. See BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., supra note 226, at 112; Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability
Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J.
347, 379 (1993).
270. See Netanel, supra note 269, at 378.
271. Id.; see also EBERLE, supra note 231, at 79-80.
272. PINCKAERS, supra note 179, at 244. Pinckaers explains that the author's right safe-
guards "both the financial and the personal interests of the author." Id. Under the monis-
tic theory of copyright, "an author cannot entirely or even partly assign his exclusive
(commercial) rights in his work to another party: he can only commercially exploit his
copyrights by granting licenses." Id.
273. Id.
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image: "The protected legal right ... is solely the portrayed person's
right, as a natural consequence of his personal rights, to decide freely
as to whether and how he chooses to make his image available to the
business interests of any third party."274
2. Theory Underlying the Right to One's Image
This theory of the author or individual's right to define and con-
trol the presentation of his image to the world constitutes a remarka-
bly similar right to that of the publicity right suggested by autonomy
theorists in the United States: an individual has a fundamental right to
autonomous self-definition. 275 A critical difference, however, remains
in that the publicity right in the United States constitutes an intellec-
tual property right,276 whereas personality rights in Germany are per-
sonal rights that sound in tort.277 This difference results from the fact
that in the United States, the natural rights justification for intellec-
tual property views ideal objects as external to the self,278 whereas in
Germany, the prevailing approach to ideal objects (such as an au-
thor's expression and individual persona) views intangibles as integral
to the self-the "free unfolding of [the] personality" in the world. 279
In the United States, the right of publicity has developed as a property
right buttressed by Lockean labor theory,280 whereas in Germany, the
right to control one's image has developed according to Kantian ide-
alist philosophy by way of German copyright doctrine. 28'
274. BGHJune 26, 1981, 81 BGHZ 75 (80) (F.R.G.) (Carrerra), translated in 14 IIC 288,
290-291 (1983); see also BGH Feb. 14, 1958, 26 BGHZ 349 (355) (F.R.G.) (Herrenreiter),
translated in MARKESINIS, A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION, supra note 227, at 418. In the Her-
renreiter decision, the court noted that the protection established by section 22 rests:
[I]n essence on the fundamental principle of a person's freedom in his highly
personal private life, in which the outward appearance of human being plays an
essential part.... The reason a third person's arbitrary publication of a portrait is
not allowed is that the person portrayed is thereby deprived of his freedom to
dispose by his own decision of this interest in his individual sphere.
BGHZ 26, 349 (355) (Herrenreiter).
275. See supra Parts I.C.3, I.C.4.
276. McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 1:3.
277. Liability for infringement of personality rights is provided under "the other right"
of BGB section 823. See BGHZ 26, 349 (354-55) (Herrenreiter), translated in MARKESINIS, A
COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION, supra note 227, at 417-18; see also BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., supra
note 226, at 97.
278. See Netanel, supra note 269, at 354, 356-58.
279. See EBERLE, supra note 231, at 61 (internal quotations omitted).
280. See supra Parts I.B.1, I.B.2.
281. BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., supra note 226, at 10; Netanel, supra note 269, at 378-79; see
JORGEN SIMON, DAs ALLGEMEINE PERSONLICHKEITSRECHT UND SEINE GEWERBLICHEN ER-
SCHEINUNGSFOLMEN: FIN ENTwICKLUNGSPROZESS [THE GENERAL RIGHT OF PERSONALITY AND
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For Kant, individuals possess innate freedom and capacity to ex-
ert their free will in and upon the world of external objects. 282 Exter-
nal things constitute the objects of the free activity of the human
will.28 3 Objects may be appropriated and disposed of through exercise
of the human will, and are thus different from or other than the per-
son. 284 If something is external, it can be possessed and alienated, and
if something is internal, such as the individual's body or personality, it
cannot be alienated. 28 5 According to Kant:
Man cannot dispose over himself because he is not a thing; he is
not his own property; to say that he is would be self-contradictory;
for in so far as he is a person he is a Subject in whom the owner-
ship of things can be vested, and if he were his own property, he
would be a thing over which he could have ownership. But a per-
son cannot be a property, and so cannot be a thing which can be
owned, for it is impossible to be a person and a thing, the proprie-
tor and the property.
2 8 6
Furthermore, according to Kant, a "propertization of the proprie-
tor"287 constitutes a violation of an ethical principle that imposes an
affirmative obligation on each individual. 288 The alienation of the in-
dividual in the treatment of oneself or another as a thing constitutes a
ITS COMMERCIAL FoRMs] 38-43 (1981) (noting the influence of German theorists Otto von
Gierke and Philippe Allfeld in the development of the German theory of copyright and
the general right of personality).
282. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 31-32 (W. Hastie trans., T & T Clark
1887) (1797) [hereinafter KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW] ("A Person is a Subject who is
capable of having his actions imputed to him. Moral Personality is, therefore, nothing but
the Freedom of a rational Being under Moral laws .... [A] Person is properly subject to no
other Laws than those he lays down for himself, either alone or in conjunction with
others."); see also Netanel, supra note 269, at 359.
283. See KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw, supra note 282, at 32 ("A Thing is what is
incapable of being the subject of Imputation. Every object of the free activity of the Will,
which is itself void of freedom, is therefore called a Thing (res corporealis).").
284. Id. at 62 ("The description of an Object as 'external to me' may signify either that it
is merely 'different and distinct from me as a Subject,' or that it is also 'a thing placed
outside of me .... ").
285. IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 166 (L. Infield trans., Methuen & Co.,
1930) (1924) ("The underlying moral principle is that man is not his own property and
cannot do with his body what he will. The body is part of the self; in its togetherness with
the self it constitutes the person; a man cannot make of his person a thing .....
286. Id. at 165.
287. Netanel, supra note 269, at 360 n.48.
288. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw, supra note 282, at 99 ("[A] man may be his own
Master (suijuris) but not the Proprietor of himself (sui dominis), so as to be able to dispose
of himself at will, to say nothing of the possibility of such a relation to other men; because
he is responsible to Humanity in his own person."); see Netanel, supra note 269, at 360
n.48.
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denigration of what it means to be human, not only for the individual
concerned, but for all of humanity. 28 9
Kant viewed an author's words as an expression that constituted
an action of the will, rather than an external thing.2 9 0 An author's
right in a work constitutes a fundamentally personal right, not a right
"in the thing . . . but an innate right, in his own person."291 Kant
characterized this personal right as an act of communication, 292 an
aspect of autonomy and freedom,2 93 "the one sole original, inborn
Right belonging to every man in virtue of his Humanity." 29 4 Based on
this theory, German courts have interpreted section 22 similarly, with
the right to one's image conceived as an innate right, inherent in the
person, and generally inalienable. 295 Just as the author has the inher-
ent right to determine the communication of the author's thoughts to
the public,2 9 6 the individual has the inherent right to determine
whether and how his image will be displayed in the world.2 97
3. Restrictions on the Right to One's Image: Personal Features
Section 22 provides that pictures shall only be published or
presented to the general public with the consent of the depicted per-
son.298 The right protects the freedom of every person to determine if
and how his image is presented and used in public.2 99 Although, as in
the United States, German courts construe the right to one's image
289. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw, supra note 282, at 99; Netanel, supra note 269, at
360 n.48.
290. IMMANUEL KANT, Of the Injustice of Counterfeiting Books, in IMMANUEL KANT, FOUR
NEGLECTED ESSAYS 45 (J. Richardson trans., Philopsychy Press 1994) (1798) [hereinafter
KANT, Of the Injustice of Counterfeiting Books]. Kant viewed books, as the acts (operae) of the
author's speech and as having "their existence only in a person." Id.; KANT, THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF LAW, supra note 282, at 64 (describing as external objects of the will only corporeal
external things, another's free will in the performance of a particular act, and certain sta-
tus relationships); see also Netanel, supra note 269, at 374.
291. KANT, Of the Injustice of Counterfeiting Books, supra note 290, at 45 *{861.
292. Id. ("The [author] takes the book as a writing or a speech ...
293. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 282, at 56.
294. Id.
295. See, e.g., BGHZ Dec. 1, 1999, 143 BGZH 214 (220) (Marlene Dietrich 1), translated in
MARKESINIS, COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY, supra note 230, at 408 (stating that general and
specific personality rights insofar as they protect non-material interests are indissolubly
bound to the person of the holder of them and, as highly personal rights, are not inaliena-
ble); see also BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., supra note 226, at 108; Bergmann, supra note 37, at
520-21.
296. See Netanel, supra note 269, at 374-75.
297. See PINCKAERS, supra note 179, at 242.
298. KUG § 22.
299. Bergmann, supra note 37, at 503.
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broadly,300 they require that the individual be identifiable by some
typically individual feature, generally interpreted as a physical charac-
teristic.30 1 The depicted person must be recognizable, if the person is
shown from behind, as long as the viewer may discern typically recog-
nizable features, the individual's right to his or her image may be vio-
lated.30 2 In a case involving an advertisement for a television
manufacturer which depicted the back of a famous soccer goalkeeper,
the Federal Supreme Court held that the goalkeeper was easily recog-
nizable by his particular stature, posture, and haircut.30 3 As long as a
particular group of consumers could identify the goalkeeper, the
court did not need to find that everyone would for the defendant to
be liable under section 22.304
Section 22 would arguably restrict German courts from finding
that associative items, 30 5 robots,30 6 or other such evocations of per-
sona actionable that courts in the United States have held to be viola-
tions of the right of publicity.30 7 However, German courts have
300. KUG § 22 grants individuals the exclusive right to decide to display and distribute
their own image ("Bildnis") (literally, "portrait"). See, e.g., OLG Hamburg, Apr. 25, 2003,
2004 Multimedia und Recht [MMR] [Multimedia and Law] 413 (F.R.G.) (Oliver Kahn)
(holding that section 22 covered the depiction of the German national goalkeeper in a
computer game when the character was sufficiently portrayed by typical characteristics of
his appearance so that he was recognizable); BGH Nov. 17, 1960, 1961 GRUR 138 (139)
(F.R.G.) (Familie Schdlermann) (finding that the depiction of an actor from a hugely popu-
lar television series in television advertisements implicated section 22 because the actor was
recognizable in outward appearance); see also BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., supra note 226, at 106
(noting that section 22 has been interpreted to include every type of image, including
photographs, motion pictures, statues, and even death masks).
301. See, e.g., BGH June 9, 1965, 1966 GRUR 102 (F.R.G.) (Spielgefahrtin) [Playmate]
(stating that a "portrait" (Bildnis) generally constitutes the depiction of facial features, but
that it is sufficient if the depiction portrays an individual in his outward appearance so long
as he is identifiable from other individuals).
302. See, e.g., BGH July 2, 1974, 1975 GRUR 561, (F.R.G.) (Nacktaufnahmen) [Nude
Photos] (holding that a model's right to her image and general personality right was vio-
lated when photographs of her naked back were displayed); BGH June 26, 1979, Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] [Weekly Judicial Reports] 2205 (2205) (F.R.G.) (Fuss-
balltor) [Soccer Goal]; see also BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., supra note 226, at 106. Under section
22, for example, it is arguable whether German courts would find a violation of the plain-
tiffs right in a case like Motschenbacher, where the specific features of the driver were un-
recognizable, but consumers could have assumed that Motschenbacher was driving the car
because other indicia of identity indicated that the car was very similar to Mot-
schenbacher's car. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 822-23
(9th Cir. 1974).
303. NJW 1979, 2205 (2205) (Fussballtor).
304. Id.
305. See Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 822-23.
306. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992), r'hg
denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).
307. See supra Part I.A.1.
Winter 2008] PERSONA IN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
increasingly interpreted section 22 expansively, holding that a double
who utilizes the typical costume and gestures of a celebrity, such as the
well-known attire and seductive pose of Marlene Dietrich in her fa-
mous movie, "The Blue Angel," may infringe section 22.308 In that
case, the crucial issue before the court was whether the use of the
double led viewers to believe the image actually depicted Marlene Die-
trich herself for the use to be actionable under section 22. - 09 This
differs from the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in the White case, where
there was obviously no question that consumers actually believed the
robot was Vanna White, yet the court nonetheless still found a viola-
tion of the plaintiff's right of publicity claim based on the robot's evo-
cation of the plaintiff's identity.3 10
Because the scope of section 22 depends on its articulation as a
personal right inherent in the individual and is based on individual
autonomy,311 the right to one's image generally implicates immedi-
ately personal attributes, usually physical, that typify an individual's
outward appearance. 312 Section 22 thus typically encompasses nar-
rower parameters of identity protection than the expanded associative
elements of persona applied by courts in the United States.3 13 For le-
gal scholars in the United States who have looked to ground the right
of publicity on a rationale other than the solely economic, a right
based on autonomous self-definition as conceptualized in Germany
offers an instructive example as to how such a rearticulation of public-
ity rights might limit the scope of the doctrine when based on a theory
of individual autonomy.
4. Restrictions on the Right: Public Interest
Section 23 provides a significant codified limitation to the right
to one's image by codifying exceptions for the public's interest in in-
308. BGH Dec. 1, 1999, 2000 GRUR 715 (717) (F.R.G.) (Der Blaue Engel) [The Blue
Angel]; BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., supra note 226, at 106.
309. Id. The defendant had argued that it was not liable under section 22 because the
facial features of the double were clearly visible in the advertisement and because the
double was enacting a scene from a film and therefore not infringing the actual persona of
Marlene Dietrich. Id. at 716. The Federal Supreme Court disagreed. Id. As long as the
advertisement conveyed the impression through other well-known identifying features that
the person was Marlene Dietrich, the court found the defendant liable. Id. at 717.
310. White, 971 F.2d at 1399.
311. See supra Part II.B.2.
312. See, e.g., BGH June 9, 1965, 1966 GRUR 102 (F.R.G.) (Spzelgefdhrtin).
313. See, e.g., White, 971 F.2d at 1399; Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,
698 F.2d 831, 836-37 (6th Cir. 1983); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498
F.2d 821, 822-23 (9th Cir. 1974).
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formation, which may sometimes outweigh the individual's right to
autonomous self-definition in the depiction of their identity. 31 4
The most important exception provides for pictures from the
sphere of contemporary history,31 5 which covers pictures concerning
the political, social, economic, sporting, and cultural life of the na-
tion.3 16 Any person linked to a newsworthy event or matters of public
interest from the past, present, or future may fall within the exception
and be regarded as a "person of contemporary history" (Person der
Zeitgeschichte).31 7 The German courts have held that the public in-
terest in information extends to entertainment and gossip,318 but have
also specifically withheld the defense when a publication violates the
314. Section 23 provides that without the consent required by section 22 the following
may be disseminated and exhibited:
1. Portraits belonging to contemporary history;
2. Pictures in which the persons appear only as accessories to a landscape or other
locality;
3. Pictures of meetings, processions and similar proceedings in which the persons
represented have taken part;
4. Portraits not made to order, in so far as their distribution or exhibition serves
some higher interest of art.
KUG § 23(1), available at http://bundesrecht.juris.de, translated in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND
TREATIES OF THE WORLD (U.N. Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org. et al. eds., 1996-1998); see
also BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., supra note 226, at 105; Thomas R. K16tzel, Germany, in INTERNA-
TIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAws 167 (M. Henry ed., 2001). Kl6tzel states
that exceptions under section 23 do not apply without limitation. Id. at 168. According to
Kl6tzel, "The purpose of section 23(2) is to ensure that the general personality right of the
individual will be observed even though the image falls under an exception of section
23(1)." Id. Section 23(2) provides: "Such right does not apply to a dissemination or public
presentation, if by such means a legitimate interest of the person shown, or, if the person
has died, his or her family is violated." KUG § 23(2).
315. KUG § 23(1).
316. Bergmann, supra note 37, at 507.
317. Id. Two categories of persons fall within the exception: absolute public persons
and relative public persons ("absolute und relative Personen der Zeitgeschichte"). Id. "Ab-
solute public persons include those permanently bound to contemporary history, such as
politicians, members of a royal family, actors, singers, talk show hosts, and thletes." Id.
"Relative public persons are those linked only to a specific event such as parties involved in
an important trial, or participants in a game or talk show." Id. at 508. The publication of
the likeness of a relative public person falls within the exception only if it has both an
actual and recognizable connection to a specific event. Id. For example, Marlene Dietrich
constitutes an absolute public person. BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., supra note 226, at 108. In a
case involving the broadcasting of a newsclip featuring Marlene Dietrich in an advertise-
ment for a newspaper's special edition on fifty years of Germany, the Federal Supreme
Court emphasized that the advertisement depicted Marlene Dietrich as an absolute person
of contemporary history and did not imply her endorsement to a specific product. BGH
May 14, 2002, 151 BGHZ 26 (33) (F.R.G.) (Marlene Dietrich I).
318. Rather, the court construed the use of the film clip as supporting the freedom of
the press, and therefore contributing to the public interest in information. See BGHZ, 151,
26 (30-31) (Marlene Dietrich I1); see also BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., supra note 226, at 106.
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legitimate interest of the person depicted,319 defined as primarily non-
pecuniary interests, 320 consistent with the autonomy rationale under-
lying section 22.321 Generally, German courts construe the defense to
exclude advertising from the public interest by determining that using
a portrait of a celebrity in advertising primarily serves only the adver-
tiser's interest. 322 Borderline cases, however, require that the courts
balance public interest in information with commercial interests.
323
Two similar cases illustrate how German courts have balanced
these interests when cases involve both commercial and informational
elements. In the Ligaspieler decision,3 24 the defendant sold pictures of
soccer players on trading cards, sealed in paper bags, without informa-
tion indicating which specific players' pictures might be contained in
the bags. 32 5 The Federal Supreme Court refused to apply section 23,
stating that any purpose the defendant might have in conveying infor-
mation important to the public was ancillary to the primary goal of
exploiting the young consumers' desire to obtain the trading pic-
tures. 326 The Court accordingly held that the soccer players had a le-
gitimate interest in controlling the commercial use of their likenesses
319. BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., supra note 226, at 107. A recent Federal Supreme Court
decision in a series of cases concerning photos taken of Caroline of Monoco has limited
the public interest to not include information provoking solely curiosity. See BGH Mar. 6,
2007, File No. VI ZR 51/06, at 11-12, available at Der Bundesgerichtshof, http://
www.bundesgerichtshof.de. Some legal commentators see this decision as unduly restrict-
ing the freedom of the press to report information involving absolute public persons, thus
relativizing the category which should be understood as absolute. See Dietmar Hipp, Presse
Kritisiert Bundesgerichtshof [The Press Criticizes the Federal Supreme Court] SPIEGEL ON-
LINE, Mar. 7, 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/0,1518,470503,00.html;
Dietmar Hipp, die Neue Relativitatstheorie des BGH [The Federal Supreme Court's New The-
ory of Relativity], SPIEGEL ONLINE, Mar. 6, 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesell-
schaft/0,1518,470271,00.html.
320. See Christof Krfiger, Right of Privacy, Right of Personality and Commercial Advertising,
13 IIC 183, 190-91 (1982).
321. See supra Part II.B.2.
322. See, e.g., 20 BGHZ 345 (350) (Paul Dahlke) (asserting that the exception under
section 23 does not apply to the use of a celebrity's portrait for advertising purposes that
only serves commercial interests, and not the public's interest in information); see also BEV-
ERLY-SMITH ET AL., supra note 226, at 107.
323. See, e.g., Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt [OLG Frankfurt] [Frankfurt Court of Ap-
peals] Jan. 1, 1988, 1989 NJW 402 (403) (F.R.G.) (Boris Becker) (holding that the section 23
exception applied to the use of the tennis player's image on the cover of a book concern-
ing individual tennis techniques as a legitimate public interest in weighing the public inter-
est against the commercial use of Boris Becker's likeness); see also BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL.,
supra note 226, at 107.
324. BGH Feb. 20, 1968, 49 BGHZ 288 (F.R.G.) (Ligaspieler) [Soccer League Player].
325. Id. at 293.
326. Id. at 293-94.
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and were entitled to benefit from their popularity and their
achievements. 327
The Beckenbauer decision, 32 8 by contrast, also involved the picture
of the well-known soccer player, Franz Beckenbauer, displayed on the
cover page of a soccer calendar,3 2 9 but in that case, the court held that
the public interest in the information conveyed by the calendar
trumped the plaintiff's commercial interest in the use of the image. 330
In determining that the photograph's main purpose was to convey
information, the court emphasized the publication's specific context
and the concept of the calendar in its entirety,33' noting that Beck-
enbauer was captain of the German national team and internationally
famous at the time,332 the publication occurred subsequent to an in-
ternational soccer event, 333 and the calendar displayed Beckenbauer
as well as other players.3 34
The Beckenbauer decision exemplifies how autonomy theory might
structure the outcome of cases where the commercial use involved
does not conflict with the image the individual typically conveys to the
public (Beckenbauer was a famous soccer player and the calendar
photograph was consistent with his persona) 335 coupled with a strong
protection established for the public interest. Decisions such as Beck-
enbauer demonstrate how sensitivity to the nuances involved in these
types of cases might yield more balanced decisions when based on an
autonomy rationale rather than solely on the commercial appropria-
tion property model used in the United States.
5. Alienability Restrictions: Recent Decisions
Under section 22, "Only the person depicted is, as the holder of
the right.... entitled to decide whether, when and how [he] wishes to
present [him]self to any third party or the public."336 Although the
right to one's image is a personal right, it encompasses economic and
moral interests, as a hybrid right akin to copyright, as is shown by the
327. Id. at 294; Bergmann, supra note 37, at 508-09.
328. BGH Feb. 6, 1979, 1979 NJW 2203 (F.R.G.) (Fussballspieler/Beckenbauer).
329. Id.; Bergmann, supra note 37, at 509.
330. NJW 1979, 2203 (2204) (Fussballspieler/Beckenbauer).
331. Id.
332. Id. at 2203-04.
333. Id. at 2203.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 2203-04.
336. BGH Oct. 14, 1986, 1987 GRUR 128 (F.R.G.) (Nena), translated in 19 IIC 269, 271
(1988).
Winter 2008]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
language quoted above.3 37 While in the United States, the right of
publicity constitutes a freely transferable property right, German
courts have traditionally not permitted transfer of ownership of the
right to one's image, or any other personality rights on the grounds
that all such rights are personal rights. 338 Recent decisions, however,
indicate that German courts may be increasingly willing to interpret
personality rights to allow for a limited transferability,3 3 9 demonstrat-
ing a conceptual shift towards a propertization of the right.
In a case involving the famous German pop singer, Nena,340 the
singer had transferred "all the rights necessary for the commercial ex-
ploitation of the acoustical and optical aura surrounding Nena" to a
merchandising agency. 34 1 The agency brought a claim against third
party defendants who had offered posters, T-shirts, photographs, sta-
tionery, photo toothbrushes, and scarves bearing Nena's likeness with-
out the consent of the merchandising agency.342 The merchandising
agency claimed it had the exclusive rights to the commercial exploita-
tion of Nena's likeness and brought an action for compensation. 343
The Federal Supreme Court held in favor of the merchandising
agency, stating that:
At issue here is not the right to an injunction order but the right to
recover a fee which plaintiff demands for the commercial exploita-
tion of the vocalist Nena's likeness. The decision whether to award
this recovery does not require a decision on the controversial ques-
tion of whether or not the right to one's own likeness, due to its
legal nature as a general personality right, is transferable. The de-
fendant's use of Nena's likeness gave rise to the plaintiff's right to
recover the usual fee for permission to utilize the likeness which is
337. All personality rights are considered similarly nonalienable since all are personal
fights. See id. ("[T]he right to one's own likeness is a part or particular aspect of the gen-
eral personality right.... [F] rom the very nature of the right it follows that only the person
depicted is, as the holder of the fight, entitled to dispose of such likeness .... ); see also
Bergmann, supra note 37, at 513. As in copyright, a limited license allows for commercial
use, but complete transferability of ownership of the fight is not allowed. See BEVERLY-SMITH
ET AL., supra note 226, at 133; see also supra Part II.B.1.
338. See GRUR 1987, 128 (Nena), translated in 19 IIC at 271; Bergmann, supra note 37,
at 513.
339. See BGHZ Dec. 1, 1999, 143 BGZH 214 (228) (F.R.G.) (Marlene Dietrich 1), trans-
lated in MARKESINIS, COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY, supra note 230, at 412; BGH May 14,
2002, 151 BGHZ 26 (29) (F.R.G.) (Marlene Dietrich I); BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., supra note
226, at 108.
340. GRUR 1987, 128 (Nena), translated in 19 IIC at 269.
341. Id., translated in 19 IIC at 269-70.
342. Id., translated in 19 IIC at 270.
343. Id.; Bergmann, supra note 37, at 513.
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based on Sec. 812(1), Civil Code, and does not require that Nena's
right in her own likeness had been transferred to the plaintiff.
344
German legal scholars have generally interpreted this opinion as
supporting the rights of licensees to recover monetary damages.
34 5
This recovery, however, is based on an individual's ability to consent
in advance to the use of personality in exchange for a fee, which then
in practice allows the person to grant licenses to others.3 46 Courts
have not clarified, however, what effects such licenses might have and
which rights would vest in a license.3 47 However, in a decision follow-
ing the Nena3 48 case, the Federal Supreme Court further supported
the transferability of the economic aspects of general personality
rights by holding that these aspects of personality rights are
descendible.349
In a case involving the use of Marlene Dietrich's picture on
memorabilia such as T-shirts, mugs, and telephone cards, the Federal
Supreme Court held that the daughter of the late actress could obtain
an injunction and damages against the producer of a musical who had
sold the various items of merchandising, and also granted a car manu-
facturer the right to produce a special model named "Marlene."3 50 In
its decision, the Court offered a detailed explanation of the two as-
pects of the personality right as protecting not only personal, but also
economic interests.3 5 1
The Bundesgerichtshof has always included the commercial inter-
ests in the personality within the protection guaranteed by the per-
sonality rights. The personality rights should accordingly protect
344. Id., translated in 19 IIC at 271.
345. See, e.g., Bergmann, supra note 37, at 513-14. This interpretation is in line with
German copyright doctrine where a limited license allows for the commercial exploitation
of the work, but transferability of ownership is not allowed. See PINCKAERS, supra note 179,
at 244.
346. Bergmann, supra note 37, at 513.
347. See GRUR 1987, 128-29 (Nena), translated in 19 IIC at 271-72; BGHZ Dec. 1, 1999,
143 BGZH 214 (220-21) (F.R.G.) (Marlene Dietrich 1), translated in MARKESINIS, COMPARA-
TIVE METHODOLOGY, supra note 230, at 408-09; see also BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., supra note
226, at 130; Bergmann, supra note 37, at 513.
348. GRUR 1987, 128 (Nena), translated in 19 IIC at 271.
349. BGHZ 143, 214 (220, 223-32) (Marlene Dietrich 1), translated in MARKESINIS, COM-
PARATIVE METHODOLOGY, supra note 230, at 408, 410-15.
350. Id., translated in MARKESINIS, COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY, supra note 230, at
401-02; see also BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., supra note 226, at 104. The Federal Court of Justice
in Marlene Dietrich I specifically stated that the Nena decision (as well as others) had inti-
mated the extent to which economic aspects of personality rights might be considered
transferable. BGHZ, 143, 214 (221) (Marlene Dietrich 1), translated in MARKESINIS, COMPARA-
TIVE METHODOLOGY, supra note 230, at 408.
351. BGHZ 143, 214 (217-228) (Marlene Dietrich 1), translated in MARKESINIS, COMPARA-
TIVE METHODOLOGY, supra note 230, at 404-15.
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the right of free decision, belonging only to the person entitled, on
the question of whether and under what conditions his picture or
his name-and the same applies for other characteristic features of
the personality-is used for the business interests of third
parties .352
In determining that Marlene Dietrich's daughter had standing to
bring a claim, the Court held that personality rights, insofar as they
protected economic interests, were descendible. 353 Heirs of a de-
ceased individual inherit the personality right to the extent that they
are entitled to grant licenses and to claim damages for unauthorized
use.354 Justifying its decision, the Court emphasized that the increas-
ing expansion of the technological capabilities for image and sound
reproduction and dissemination made economic exploitation of iden-
tity more probable for advertising purposes.355 The Court thus stated
that an effective posthumous protection of the elements of the right
of personality that are of financial value required that the heir be-
come the holder of the right of personality, 356 and in defending the
presumed interests of the deceased, proceed in the same way as that
person could have done against an authorized exploitation.357
In this way, the Court viewed the right of personality as being
strengthened, rather than weakened, by the recognition that an inde-
pendent inheritable element of the right of personality which has fi-
nancial value entitles the heir to acquire his or her own defensive
rights and compensation for harm. 358 The Court pointed out, how-
ever, that the rights of the heir derive from the owner of the personal-
ity right and cannot be used in a manner contrary to his or her
352. Id. at 220, translated in MARKESINIS, COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY, supra note 230, at
408.
Insofar as the rights of personality protect non-material interests, they are indis-
solubly bound to the person of the holder of them and, as highly personal rights,
are not renounceable and are inalienable, and are therefore not transferable and
not inheritable .... No-one can relinquish his right to his own picture, his right
to his name or another personality right completely and conclusively. This would
contradict the guarantee of human dignity [Article I of the Basic Law] and of the
right to self-determination [Article 2 of the Basic Law; other references omitted].
Id.
353. Id. at 228-32, translated in MARKESINIS, COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY, supra note
230, at 409, 412-15.
354. Id. at 228-29, translated in MARKESINIS, COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY, supra note
230, at 412-13.
355. Id. at 222-23, translated in MARKESINIS, COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY, supra note
230, at 409-10.
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presumed wishes.3 59 "The heir is only allowed to use the opportunities
for marketing which exist or continue after the death on taking the
deceased's will into account. '3 60 In this case, the Court found that the
measures taken by Marlene Dietrich's daughter were unquestionably
in the interest of her deceased mother. 361
These two recent decisions suggest the extent to which the Ger-
man courts are willing to consider a limited transfer of the rights of
personality. In particular, the Marlene Dietrich362 decision shows that in
allowing a limited transfer of the right, the Federal Supreme Court
resorted to labor theory justifications similar to those employed by
courts in the United States. 363 The Court noted that individuals con-
tribute to the value of their persona through special achievements. 364
This relaxation of the restrictions on the alienability of personality
rights pleases critics who argue that Germany should follow the
United States and provide for similarly-conceptualized publicity
rights.3 6 5
The fact remains, however, that the thrust of the Court's argu-
ment in favor of allowing limited transferability of financial elements
of a personality claim remained embedded in the Court's focus on the
individual's right to determine the presentation of their image to the
public. 36 6 This emphasis in turn rests on an overall view of general
personality rights as based on the individual's autonomous right to
self-definition, the fundamental freedom each individual possesses to
determine which use of his personality to permit or prohibit.




362. BGH Dec. 1, 1999, 143 BGHZ 214 (F.R.G.) (Marlene Dietrich 1).
363. Id. at 219, translated in MARKESINIS, COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY, supra note 230, at
407.
364. Id.
365. See, e.g., Klink, supra note 10, at 381. Klink interprets this decision as a clear indica-
tor that the personality right in Germany has fallen short of satisfactorily dealing with the
exploitation of identity. Id. He views as doubtful whether a personality right can be
stretched far enough to keep up with a fully-fledged publicity right. Id. "The price of
stretching the human right of personality further towards a publicity right might be dilu-
tion of the first and confusion about the second. At the end of this road stands a weaker
personality right and an ineffective sort of personality-publicity right." Id.
366. BGHZ 143, 214 (226-27) (Marlene Dietrich 1), translated in MARKESINIS, COMPARA-
TIVE METHODOLOGY, supra note 230, at 412.
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III. Conclusion
While many scholars of publicity and personality rights have re-
garded the United States as "at the forefront of nations regarding the
development and implementation of a legal doctrine, the right of
publicity,"3 67 few have analyzed how publicity rights in the United
States might profit from a comparative approach. 368 The recent rear-
ticulation of publicity rights grounded in autonomy theory, however,
suggests that the right of publicity would benefit from a closer look at
its German counterpart. First, because German personality rights are
personal rights, their application remains typically restricted to fea-
tures inherent in the individual. 369 This restriction acts to constrain
overly-expansive evocations of identity that critics of publicity rights
have found troubling in the United States.3 70 The narrower scope of
German personality rights thus helps limit potential infringement
upon protected speech. Moreover, because German courts envision
personality rights as hybrids, the rights protect both economic and
personal interests,3 7 1 and do not require an artificial dichotomous ap-
proach to the harm experienced by the individual whose fundamental
right to control the use of persona has been infringed.372
Second, German personality rights contain a broad codified re-
striction that provides explicit exceptions from liability for use of
images concerning the sphere of contemporary history.373 German
courts broadly construe this exception to include commercial use for
purposes of merchandising and carefully scrutinize the interests impli-
367. Kwall, supra note 8, at 152.
368. See, e.g., Grant, supra note 8, at 562 (acknowledging a new internationally-recog-
nized right of publicity should embrace both the traditional American economic rationales
for the right, based on the commercial value of the persona, and the social values of the
right which derive from the idea of personal autonomy and moral rights).
369. See supra Part II.B.3.
370. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992),
r'hg denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,
698 F.2d 831, 836-37 (6th Cir. 1983); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498
F.2d 821, 822-23 (9th Cir. 1974. See generally supra Parts I.A.2, I.C.3.
371. See supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2.
372. See Goodenaugh, supra note 1, at 55 (describing the difficulty in distinguishing
"personal" harm and interests on the one hand, and "commercial" harm and interests on
the other in the subjective experience of the plaintiff and the irrelevance of the distinction
except as a result of doctrinal development between privacy and publicity rights in the
United States).
373. See supra Part II.B.4. McCarthy notes that some courts and commentators in the
United States have suggested that the right of publicity should also directly integrate First
Amendment values into the cause of infringement of the right of publicity. See 2 McCAR-
THY, supra note 9, § 8:35.
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cated when balancing the public's interest in information against
commercial protection. 374 In the United States, however, the rhetori-
cal force of the intellectual property label that underlies the right of
publicity has often blinded the courts to this delicate balance and pro-
voked the right's expansion, allowing commercial use to trump other
interests, including those of the First Amendment.3 75
Third, recent developments in German personality law demon-
strate the inevitability and necessity of a limited form of property in
persona required by modern commercial markets. 376 However, as the
Federal Supreme Court has established, a limited form of a hybrid
personal and property right, when grounded in individual autonomy,
can provide a coherent structure for an identity right incorporating
both moral and commercial interests. 377 This framing of the right
thus allows for limited transferability, the purpose for which the right
in the United States was originally created. 378 The German model of
personality rights, structured by a Kantian notion of individual auton-
omy, indicates how publicity rights may function as a sui generis prop-
erty right, incorporating a "mixture of personal rights, property rights,
and rights under the law of unfair competition."379
The right of publicity arose in the United States as a response to
functionalist concerns on the part of judges who saw the need for a
limited form of assignability to accommodate existing business prac-
tices.380 Since its original functionalist inception in the United States,
however, courts have afforded the right of publicity the attributes of
intellectual property even as the traditional intellectual property ratio-
nales supporting the right's validity have been roundly criticized.381
374. See supra Parts II.B.4, II.B.5.
375. See generally supra Part I.A.2.
376. BGH Oct. 14, 1986, 1987 GRUR 128 (F.R.G.) (Nena), translated in 19 IIC 269, 269
(1988); BGHZ Dec. 1, 1999, 143 BGZH 214 (220-21) (F.R.G.) (MarleneDietrich 1), translated
in MARKESINIS, COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY, supra note 230, at 401; see Biene, supra note
254, at 517 (observing that the German Federal Supreme Court in the Marlene Dietrich
decision "consciously took a step forward in order to move towards greater convergence
with the international state of affairs in personality protection and marketing" (citation
omitted)). Biene reiterates that some German commentators now consider that further
developments will be similar to those in the United States. Id.
377. See PINCKAERS, supra note 179, at 245 (stating that personal autonomy justification
can justify the protection of both commercial and personality interests).
378. See Westfall & Landau, supra note 28, at 76-79 (asserting that the right of publicity
emerged from a functionalist concern to allow the right to be alienable via assignment or
license); see also McCARTHY, supra note 9, §§ 1:26-27.
379. McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 1:7.
380. See Westfall & Landau, supra note 28, at 76-79, 122-23.
381. See supra Parts I.B, I.C.
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The German model of personality rights demonstrates how a coher-
ent rationale based on individual autonomy curtails the right's expan-
sive tendencies while providing an impetus for stronger protections
for the free dissemination of information. In considering the rele-
vance of German personality rights to the United States publicity
right, legal scholars advocating a rearticulation of the right based on
an autonomy rationale should find both support for the plausibility of
their claims as well as a potentially instructive example of how such a
right should be structured.
